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IF HE HOLLERS LET HIM GO: REGULATING 
RACIST SPEECH ON CAMPUS 
CHARLES R. LAWRENCE 111* 
NEWSREEL I 
Racist incidents at the University of Michigan, University of Massachu-
setts-Amherst, University of Wisconsin, University of New Mexico, Co-
lumbia University, Wellesley College, Duke University, and University 
of California-Los Angeles.2 
The campus ought to be the last place to legislate tampering with the edges 
of first amendment protections. 
University of Michigan: 
"Greek Rites of Exclusion": Racist leaflets in donus, white students 
paint themselves black and place rings in their noses at ''jungle parties."3 
Silencing a few creeps is no victory if the price is an abrogation of free 
speech. Remember censorship is an ugly word too. 
Copyright © Charles R. Lawrence III 1990. 
• Professor of Law, Stanford Law School, Stanford University. B.A., 1965, Haverford Col-
lege; J.D., 1969, Yale Law School. I wish to acknowledge the American Civil Liberties Union Bien-
nial Conference, Stanford Law School, and the Duke University School of Law where tentative 
versions of this Article along with Professor Strossen's Article, infra, were presented. I am indebted 
to Stephen Arons, Thomas Grey, and Sylvia Law for their helpful comments on earlier drafts, to 
David Drummond, Marti Paschal, and Mark Niles for their research assistance, to Richard Delgado 
and Marl Matsuda for their trailblazing work on the subject of racist speech, and to countless others 
who have challenged and supported me in my efforts to understand this issue. The title of this 
Article is inspired by the work by CHESTER HIMES, IF HE HOLLERS LET HIM Go (1945). 
An earlier version of this Article, along with an earlier version of Professor Strossen's Article, 
Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal? 1990 DUKE L.J. 484, were presented as 
papers for a plenary session of the 1989 Biennial Conference of the American Civil Liberties Union. 
Papers presented at this session served as a basis of discussion by delegates in small working groups 
who then proposed policy resolutions for adoption by the convention. Following a spirited debate, a 
resolution supporting narrowly framed restrictions of racist speech on campuses was defeated by the 
convention. 
1. The events that appear in this newsreel are gathered from newspaper and magazine reports 
of racist incidents on campuses. Each of them is followed by a statement, appearing in italics, 
criticizing proposals to regulate racism on campus. The latter have been garnered from 
conversations, debates, and panel discussions at which I have been present. Some I managed to 
record verbatim and are exact quotes; others paraphrase the sentiment expressed. I have heard some 
version of each of these arguments many times over. 
2. White, The New Racists, Ms. MAG., Oct. 1987, at 68. 
3. Lord, Frats and Sororities: The Greek Rites of Exclusion, NATION, July 4, 1987, at 10. 
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Northwest Missouri State University: 
White Supremacists distribute flyers stating, "The Knights of the Ku 
Klux Klan are Watching YoU."4 
Kansas University: 
KKK members speak. S 
Temple University: 
White Student Union formed.6 
Stanford University: 
Aryan Resistance literature distributed.7 
Stockton State College (New Jersey): 
Invisible Empire literature distributed.8 
Memphis State University: 
Bomb Threats at Jewish Student Union.9 
Arizona State University: 
Shot fired at Hillel Foundation building. 1o 
The harm that censors allege will result unless speech is forbidden rarely 
occurs. 
Dartmouth College: 
Black professor called "a cross between a welfare queen and a bathroom 
attendant" and the Dartmouth Review purported to quote a black stu-
dent, "Dese boys be sayin' that we be comin' here to Dartmut an' not 
takin' the classics. . . ." 11 
Yes, speech is sometimes painful. Sometimes it is abusive. That is one of 
the prices of a free society. 
Purdue University: 
Counselor finds "Death Nigger" scratched on her door.12 
More speech, not less, is the proper cure for offensive speech. 







11. Wiener, Racial Hatred on Campus, NATION, Feb. 27, 1989, at 260. 
12. Id. 
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Smith College: 
African student finds message slipped under her door that reads, "Afri-
can Nigger do you want some bananas? Go back to the Jungle."13 
Speech cannot be banned simply because it is offensive. 
University of Michigan: 
Campus radio station broadcasts a call from a student who ''joked'': 
"Who are the most famous black women in history? Aunt Jemima and 
Mother Fucker."14 
Those who don't like what they are hearing or seeing should try to change 
the atmosphere through education. That is what they will have to do in the 
real world after they graduate. 
University of Michigan: 
A student walks into class and sees this written on the blackboard: "A 
mind is a terrible thing to waste---especially on a nigger."ls 
People of color, women, and gays and lesbians owe their vibrant political 
movements in large measure to their freedom to communicate. If speech 
can be banned because it offends someone, how long will it be before the 
messages of these groups are themselves found offensive? 
Stanford University: 
"President Donald Kennedy refused yesterday to consider amnesty for 
students who took over his office last week .... Kennedy insisted that the 
probe of violations of the Stanford behavior code go forward. The stu-
dents [who were demanding more minority faculty and ethnic studies 
reforms] consider the prospect of disciplinary action unfair in view of 
Stanford's decision earlier this year not to punish two white students who 
defaced a poster of 19th century composer Ludwig von Beethoven to 
portray a stereotypical black face, then tacked it up in a predominantly 
black dormitory. The two incidents differ sharply, Kennedy said. The 
poster was admittedly racially offensive. But its defacement probably 
was protected by constitutional freedoms. However, the office takeover 
was 'clearly a violation' of Stanford's policy against campus 
disruption."16 
Now it's the left that is trying to restrict free speech . . . . [tJhough the 
13. Lewis, Amid Push for Diversity, Smith Struggles with Racism, Boston Globe, May 4, 1989, 
§ I, at I, col. 2. 
14. Wiener, supra note 11, at 260. 
IS. Hundley, Black Students Take Action, Chicago Tribune, Apr. 23, 1989, § I, at 4, col. 1. 
16. Workman, Stanford President Denies Amnesty to Students, San Francisco Chron., May 25, 
1989, at A8, col. 1. 
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political labels have shifted, the rationale is the same: Our adversaries are 
dangerous and therefore should not be allowed to speak. 17 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, American campuses have seen a resurgence of racial 
violence and a corresponding rise in the incidence of verbal and symbolic 
assault and harassment to which blacks and other traditionally subju-
gated groups are subjected. IS There is a heated debate in the civi1liber-
ties community concerning the proper response to incidents of racist 
speech on campus. Strong disagreements have arisen between those indi-
viduals who believe that racist speech, such as that contained in the 
Newsreel that opens this Article, should be regulated by the university or 
some public body and those individuals who believe that racist expres-
sion should be protected from all public regulation. At the center of the 
controversy is a tension between the constitutional values of free speech 
and equality. Like the debate over affirmative action in university admis-
sions, this issue has divided old allies and revealed unrecoguized or unac-
knowledged differences in the experience, perceptions, and values of 
members of longstanding alliances. It also has caused considerable soul-
searching by individuals with long-time commitments to both the cause 
of political expression and the cause of racial equality. 
I write this Article from within the cauldron of this controversy,19 I 
make no pretense of dispassion or objectivity, but I do claim a deep com-
mitment to the values that motivate both sides of the debate.20 As I 
struggle with the tension between these constitutional values, I particu-
larly appreciate the experience of both belonging and not belonging that 
gives to African Americans and other outsider groups a sense of duality. 
17. Dembart. At Stanford, Leftists Become Censors, N.Y. Times. May 5. 1989. at A35. col. 2. 
18. The incidents contained in the "Newsreel" are but a small sampling of the hate speech to 
which minorities are subjected on a daily basis on our nation's college campuses. For a catalogue of 
numerous other examples of such incidents. see H. EHRLICH. CAMPUS ETHNOVIOLENCE AND THE 
POLICY OPTIONS 41-72 (National Institute Against Prejudice & Violence. Institute Report No.4 
1990). 
19. See Dembart. supra note 17; Will. Liberal Censorship, Wash. Post. Nov. 5. 1989. at C7. col. 
4; France. Hate Goes to Col/ege, A.B.A. J .• July 1990. at 44-49; Blum and Lobaes. Fighting Words at 
the ACLU, CALIF. LAW •• Feb. 1990, at 44. 
20. I have spent the better part of my life as a dissenter. As a high school student I was 
threatened with suspension for my refusal to participate in a civil defense drill. and I have been a 
conspicuous consumer of my first amendment liberties ever since. I also have experienced the injury 
of the historical, ubiquitous, and continuous defamation of American racism. I grew up with Little 
Black Sambo and Amos and Andy (for an autobiographical narrative reeounting my encounters 
with these American cultural artifacts. see Lawrence, The Id, the Ego and Equal Protection: Reck-
oning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 317-18 (1987». and I continue to receive 
racist tracts in the mail and shoved under my door. 
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W.E.B. Du Bois-scholar and founder of the National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People-called the gift and burden inherent 
to the dual, conflicting heritage of all African Americans their "second-
sight."21 
The "double consciousness" of groups outside the ethnic main-
stream is particularly apparent in the context of this controversy. Blacks 
know and value the protection the first amendment affords those of us 
who must rely upon our voices to petition both government and our 
neighbors for redress of grievances. Our political tradition has looked to 
"the word," to the moral power of ideas, to change a system when 
neither the power of the vote nor that of the gun are available. This part 
of us has known the experience of belonging and recognizes our common 
and inseparable interest in preserving the right of free speech for all. But 
we also know the experience of the outsider. The Framers excluded us 
from the protection of the first amendment.22 The same Constitution 
that established rights for others endorsed a story that proclaimed our 
inferiority. It is a story that remains deeply ingrained in the American 
psyche.23 
We see a different world than that which is seen by Americans who 
do not share this historical experience.24 We often hear racist speech 
when our white neighbors are not aware of its presence.2S 
It is not my purpose to belittle or trivialize the importance of de-
fending unpopular speech against the tyranny of the majority. 'There are 
very strong reasons for protecting even racist speech. Perhaps the most 
important reasons are that it reinforces our society'S commitment to the 
21. W.E.B. Du BoiS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 16-17 (1953). According to Du Bois, 
[T]he Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with second·sight in this 
American world-a world which yields him no true self-consciousness, but only lets him 
see himself through the revelation of the other world. It is a peculiar sensation, this 
double consciousness, this sense of always looking at one's self through the eyes of others, 
of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. 
One ever feels his two-ness-an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unrccon-
ciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it 
from being tom asunder. 
22. In Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 u.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), the Court declared that at the time 
of the Declaration oflndependence, and when the Constitution of the United States was framed and 
adopted "[blacks] had no rights which the white man was bound to respect." Id. at 407. See A. L. 
HIGGINBOTHAM, IN THE MATIER OF COLOR (1978), for an analysis of statutes and judicial deci-
sions that denied the rights of blacks during the colonial period. 
23. Lawrence, supra note 20. 
24. See, e.g., Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Anti-Discrimination Law: 
A Critical Review 0/ Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978) (discussion of anti-
discrimination laws from African-American perspective). 
25. See Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. 
L. REV. 2320 (1989). Matsuda points out that the "mainstream press often ignores these stories [of 
racist speech and violence], giving rise to the view of racist and anti-Semitic incidents as random and 
isolated, and the corollary that isolated incidents are inconsequential." Id. at 2331. 
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value of tolerance,26 and that, by shielding racist speech from govern-
ment regulation, we will be forced to combat it as a community. These 
reasons for protecting racist speech should not be set aside hastily, and I 
will not argue that we should be less vigilant in protecting the speech and 
associational rights of speakers with whom most of us would disagree. 
But I am deeply concerned about the role that many civil libertari-
ans have played, or the roles we have failed to play, in the continuing, 
real-life struggle through which we define the community in which we 
live. I fear that by framing the debate as we have-as one in which the 
liberty of free speech is in conflict with the elimination of racism-we 
have advanced the cause of racial oppression and have placed the bigot 
on the moral high ground, fanning the rising flames of racism. Above all, 
I am troubled that we have not listened to the real victims, that we have 
shown so little empathy or understanding for their injury, and that we 
have abandoned those individuals whose race, gender, or sexual orienta-
tion provokes others to regard them as second class citizens. These indi-
viduals' civil liberties are most directly at stake in the debate.27 
I have set two goals in constructing this Article. The first goal is 
limited and perhaps overly modest, but it is nonetheless extremely impor-
tant. I will demonstrate that much of the argument for protecting racist 
speech28 is based on the distinction that many civil libertarians draw be-
tween direct, face-to-face racial insults, which they think deserve first 
26. L. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 7-8 (1986). 
27. This paper will focus on racism. Although much of my analysis applies to violent pornog-
raphy and homophobic hate speech, I will not address those problems directly. I will on occasion 
draw on the experience of women and gays as victims of hate speech where they operate as instruc-
tive analogues. 
28. Most of these proposals are university regulations drafted in an effort to stem the tide of 
virulent racist verbal attacks on students of color. Institutions that havc adopted policies include: 
University of California, Emory University, University of Texas, University of Wisconsin, University 
of Connecticut, University of Michigan, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, Tufts University, 
University of Pennsylvania, and Trinity College. Wilson, Colleges' Anti-Harassment Policies Bring 
Controversy Over Free-Speech Issues, Chron. Higher Educ., Oct. 4, 1989, at AI, col. 2. Other more 
far reaching proposals for regulating racist speech outside of the campus setting have appeared in the 
academic literature. See, e.g., Arkes, Civility and the Restriction o/Speech: Rediscovering the De/a-
mation o/Groups. 1974 SUP. Cr. REV. 281 (advocating group libel approach); Delgado, Words That 
Wound: A Tort Actionjor Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
133 (1982) (proposing cause of action for tort of racial insult); Downs, Skokie Revisited: Hate Group 
Speech and the First Amendment, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 629 (1985) (test to invalidate racial hate 
speech based on assaultive intent and targeting of victims); Kretzmer, Freedom 0/ Speech and Ra-
cism, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 445 (1987) (outlawing racist speech); Rabinowitz, Nazis in Skokie: Fight-
ing Words or Heckler's Veto?, 28 DE PAUL L. REV. 259 (1979) (use of fighting words doctrine to 
limit racist speech); Comment, Freedom From Fear, 15 LINCOLN L. REV. 45 (1984) (relax clear and 
present danger standard in cases where racial hatred is involved). Racist speech is rcgulated indi-
rectly under thc hostile work environment provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Aet of 1964, 
and fair election provisions of the National Labor Relations Act. See, e.g., Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 
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amendment protection, and all other fighting words, which they concede 
are unprotected by the first amendment.29 I argue that the distinction is 
false, advances none of the purposes of the first amendment, and that it is 
time to put an end to the ringing rhetoric that condemns all efforts to 
regulate racist speech, even when those efforts take the form of narrowly 
drafted provisions aimed at racist speech that results in direct, immedi-
ate, and substantial injury. 
I also urge the regulation of racial epithets and vilification that do 
not involve face-to-face encounters-situations in which the victim is a 
captive audience and the injury is experienced by all members of a racial 
group who are forced to hear or see these words; the insulting words, in 
effect, are aimed at the entire group. 
My second goal is more ambitious and more indeterminate. I pro-
pose several ways in which the traditional civil liberties position on free 
speech does not take into account important values expressed elsewhere 
in the Constitution. Further, I argue that even those values the first 
amendment itself is intended to promote are frustrated by an interpreta-
tion that is acontextual and idealized, by presupposing a world character-
ized by equal opportunity and the absence of societally created and 
culturally ingrained racism. 
This Article is divided into four parts: Part I explores whether our 
Constitution already commits us to some regulation of racist speech.30 I 
argue that it does, that this is the meaning of Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion. 31 For the time being, I would ask only that the reader be open to 
considering this interpretation of Brown. It is an idea that contains a 
lesson that is useful even for those who believe the censorship of any 
expression cannot ultimately be condoned: Brown can help us better un-
derstand the injury of racist speech, an understanding that is vital to our 
discussion. 
I also consider the implications of the state action doctrine in under-
standing Brown and argue that the public/private ideology promoted by 
that doctrine plays a critical role in advancing racism and clouding our 
N.L.R.B. 66 (1962) (setting aside a union election in which the employer used racially inflammatory 
campaign materials). 
29. A significant number of civil libertarians do not agree with the "fighting words" doctrine 
and will argue for first amendment proteetion of all face-ta-face insults. Nevertheless, the Court has 
yet to reject the reasoning in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). And there is no 
evidence that the continued usage of this approach has led down the slippery slope to rampant 
censorship. 
30. See infra notes 36-81 and accompanying text. 
31. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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VISIon of the appropriate role for the community in disestablishing 
systematic, societal group defamation. 32 
Part II considers the debate over regulation of racial harassment on 
campus.33 I argue that carefully drafted regulations can and should be 
sustained without significant departures from existing first amendment 
doctrine. The regulation of racist fighting words should not be treated 
differently than the regulation of garden variety fighting words, and cap-
tive audiences deserve no less protection when they are held captive by 
racist speakers. I also suggest that rules requiring civility and respect in 
academic discourse encourage rather than discourage the fullest ex-
change of ideas. Regulations that require civility of discourse in certain 
desiguated forums are not incursions on intellectual and political debate. 
Part III explores the nature of the injury inflicted by racist hate 
speech and examines the unstated assumptions that lie at the core of first 
amendment theory.34 In this Part, I urge reconsideration of the history 
of racism in America, the Ubiquity and continued vitality of culturally 
engendered conscious and unconscious beliefs about the inferiority of 
non-whites and the effect of inequities of power on the marketplace of 
ideas. 
In Part IV, I argue that civil libertarians must examine not just the 
substance of our position on racist speech but also the ways in which we 
enter the debate.3S The way the debate has been framed makes heroes 
out of bigots and fans the flames of racial violence. I also consider the 
reasons for some civil libertarians' resistance to even minimal and nar-
rowly drafted regulations of racist harassment. 
I. BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: A CASE ABOUT REGULATING 
RACIST SPEECH 
The landmark case of Brown v. Board of Education is not a case we 
normally think of as a case about speech. As read most narrowly, the 
case is about the rights of black children to equal educational opportu-
nity. But Brown can also be read more broadly to articulate a principle 
central to any substantive understanding of the equal protection clause, 
the foundation on which all anti-discrimination law rests. This is the 
principle of equal citizenship. Under that principle "every individual is 
presumptively entitled to be treated by the organized society as a 
32. See infra notes 60-81 and accompanying text. 
33. See infra notes 82-103 and accompanying text. 
34. See infra notes 104-58 and accompanying text. 
35. See infra notes 159-69 and accompanying text. 
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respected, responsible, and participating member. "36 Furthermore, it re-
quires the affirmative disestablishment of societal practices that treat peo-
ple as members of an inferior or dependent caste, as unworthy to 
participate in the larger community. The holding in Brown-that 
racially segregated schools violate the equal protection clause-reflects 
the fact that segregation amounts to a demeaning, caste-creating 
practice. 37 
The key to this understanding of Brown is that the practice of segre-
gation, the practice the Court held inherently unconstitutional, was 
speech. Brown held that segregation is unconstitutional not simply be-
cause the physical separation of black and white children is bad38 or be-
cause resources were distributed uneqUally among black and white 
schools.39 Brown held that segregated schools were unconstitutional pri-
marily because of the message segregation conveys-the message that 
black children are an untouchable caste, unfit to be educated with white 
children.4O Segregation serves its purpose by conveying an idea. It 
stamps a badge of inferiority upon blacks, and this badge communicates 
36. Karst, Citizenship. Race and Marginality. 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 1 (1988). 
37. The prevention of stigma was at the core of the Supreme Court's unanimous decision in 
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), that segregated public schools are inherently 
unequal. Observing that the segregation of black pupils "generates a feeling of inferiority as to their 
status in the community," id. at 494, Chief Justice Warren recognized what a majority of the Court 
had ignored almost sixty years earlier in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 u.s. 537 (1896): The social mcan-
ing of racial segregation in the United States is the designation of a superior and an inferior caste, 
and segregation proceeds "on the ground that colored citizens are ... inferior and degraded." Id. at 
560 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions. 69 YALE 
L.J. 421, 427 (1960); Brest, The Supreme Court. 1975 Term-Forward: In Defense of the Antidis-
crimination Principle. 90 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8-12 (1976); Cahn, Jurisprudence. 30 N.Y.U. L. REv. 
150, 158-59 (1955); Lawrence, supra note 20, at 349-55. Note that whUe formal, legally sanctioned 
segregation was the chief form of stigmatization prior to Brown and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1443, 1447 (1988), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-1975d, 2000a to 2000h-6 (1988), the system 
has yet to be dismantled, and other stigmatizing meehanisms-including the exclusion of blacks 
from private clubs, privately enforced housing diserimination, and deprecating portrayals of blacks 
in the media-have reinforced its effects. See Lawrence, Negroes in Contemporary Society. in MAN, 
CULTURE AND SOCIETY 52, 59 (C. Lawrence ed. 1962). For a discussion of segregation as an insti-
tutionalized, self-perpetuating mechanism of stigmatization, see Lawrence, supra note 20. 
38. Brown is not a case about the right of black children to associate with white children. See 
Black, supra note 37, at 421, 427-29, reSpondiI.lg to the argnment put forward in Weschler, Toward 
Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law. 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 31-34 (1959), that Brown was 
wrongly decided because it did not consider the non-associational rights of white students. 
39. Although separate but equal was never a reality in the segregated sehool systems of 
America, the Court assumed an equality of resources in Brown and its companion cases in order to 
consider plaintiff's argument directly challenging the constitutionality of the separate but equal doc-
trine of Plessy. see Brown. 347 U.S. at 492. 
40. For discussion of the "cultural meaning" of segregation, see Black, supra note 37; Law-
rence, Segregation "Misunderstood'~' The Milliken Decision Revisited? 12 U.S.F. L. REV. 15 (1977); 
Wasserstrom, Racism. Sexism and Preferential Treatment: An Approach to the Topics. 24 UCLA L. 
REV. 581 (1977). 
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a message to others in the community, as well as to blacks wearing the 
badge, that is injurious to blacks. Therefore, Brown may be read as regu-
lating the content of racist speech. As a regulation of racist speech, the 
decision is an exception to the usual rule that regulation of speech con-
tent is presumed unconstitutiona1.41 
A. The Conduct/Speech Distinc(ion 
Some civil libertarians argue that my analysis of Brown conftates 
speech and conduct. They maintain that the segregation outlawed in 
Brown was discriminatory conduct, not speech, and the defamatory 
message conveyed by segregation simply was an incidental by-product of 
that conduct. This position is often stated as follows: "Of course segre-
gation conveys a message but this could be said of almost all conduct. To 
take an extreme example, a murderer conveys a message of hatred for 
his victim. [But], we would not argue that we can't punish the murder-
the primary conduct-merely because of this message which is its secon-
dary byproduct."42 This objection to my reading of Brown misperceives 
the central point of the argument. I have not ignored the distinction 
between the speech and conduct elements of segregation by mistake. 
Rather, my analysis turns on that distinction. It asks the question 
whether there is a purpose for outlawing segregation that is unrelated to 
its message,43 and it concludes the answer is "no." 
41. It is important to note that Brown is a case about the State engaging in racist speech and 
that the first amendment protects individuals not thc state. Stated another way, Brown invokes the 
fourteenth amendment which prohibits states. and not individuals. from denying equal protection of 
the laws. Although this is true, I believe that reliance on the state action doctrine in this context 
avoids the real issue. It also should be noted that anti-<iiscrimination laws prohibiting segregation by 
private parties such as Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000a-6 (1988) 
(public accommodations), Title VI, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-l to 2000d-7 (1988) (federally assisted pro-
grams), Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988) (equal employment opportunities), have 
not been held unconstitutional regulations of private individuals' speech or association. 
42. Remarks by Nadine Strossen, ACLU General Counsel, responding to Professor Charles 
Lawrence at the 1989 ACLU Biennial Conference plenary session "Racism on the Rise," June 15, 
1989. The "extreme" example cited by Professor Strossen is of a kind in which the Court has been 
reluctant to concede that the first amendment has any relevance whatsoever. Thc law is not directed 
at anything resembling speech or at the views expressed. In such a case the regulation of speech is 
truly incidental to the regulation of conduct. See also. Strossen, supro note *, at 541-43. Professor 
Strossen asserts that I "chide[ ] anyone who insists that all racist conduct that includes[ ] an expres-
sive component should be treated alike-namely, as protected speech." Id. at 533. This reading of 
my position clearly misses my point. I do not contend that all conduct with an expressive compo-
nent should be treated as unprotected speech. ,To the contrary, my suggestion that racist conduct 
amounts to speech is premised upon a unique characteristic of racism-namely its reliance upon the 
defamatory message of white supremacy to achieve its injurious purpose. 
43. All communicative behavior is "100% action and 100% expression." Ely, Flag Desecra-
tion: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 
HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1495-96 (1975). Thus, the distinction between speech and conduct has little 
determinate content: "[A]ny particular course of conduct may be hung almost randomly on the 
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If, for example, John W. Davis, counsel for the Board of Education 
of Topeka, Kansas, had been asked during oral argument in Brown to 
state the Board's purpose in educating black and white children in sepa-
rate schools, he would have been hard pressed to answer in a way unre-
lated to the purpose of designating black children as inferior.44 If 
segregation's primary goal is to convey the message of white supremacy, 
then Brown's declaration that segregation is unconstitutional amounts to 
a regulation of the message of white supremacy.45 Properly understood, 
Brown and its progeny require that the systematic group defamation of 
segregation be disestablished.46 Although the exclusion of black children 
from white schools and the denial of educational resources and associa-
tion that accompany exclusion can be characterized as conduct, these 
particular instances of conduct are concerned primarily with communi-
cating the idea of white supremacy. The non-speech elements are by-
products of the main message rather than the message simply a by-prod-
uct of unlawful conduct.47 
'speech' peg or the 'conduct' peg as one sees fit." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW, 
§ 12-7, at 827 (2d ed. 1988). Tribe has suggested that "[m]eaning might be poured into the speech-
conduct dichotomy by reference to a system of free expression that permits the identification of acts 
that should be protected by the first amendment." Id.; see also United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 
367 (1968). In O'Brien the Court stated that, 
[W]hen 'speech' and 'non-speech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a 
sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the non-speech element can jus-
tify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms .. " [We] think it clear that a 
government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the 
Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; the govern-
ment interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restric-
tion on alleged first amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance 
of that interest. 
Id. at 376-77. 
44. The Court is clearest in its articulation of this understanding of the central purpose and 
meaning of segregation in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1966). In striking down the Virginia 
statute prohibiting interracial marriage, Chief Justice Warren noted that the State's purposes" 'to 
preserve the racial integrity of its citizens,' and to prevent 'the corruption of blood,' 'a mongrel breed 
of citizens,' and 'the obliteration of racial pride' [were] obviously an endorsement of the doctrine of 
White Supremacy." Id. at 7 (quoting Nairn v. Nairn, 197 Va. 80, 90, 87 S.E.2d 749, 756 (1955». 
45. In Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). the Court upheld Louisiana's racial segregation 
of railroad passengers by rejecting the argument that segregation necessarily conveyed a message 
that blacks were inferior. "If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely 
because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it." Id. at 551. But Brown expressly 
rejected this rationale. In embracing the notion that "[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently 
unequal," the Brown Court, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954), implicitly adopted the reasoning advanced in 
Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy. 163 U.S. at 560. Justice Harlan argued that provisions requiring 
separate facilities "in fact proceed on the ground that colored citizens are so inferior and degraded 
that they eannot be allowed to sit in the public coaches occupied by white citizens .... " Id. 
46. See Black, supra hote 37, at 424-26; Lawrence, supra note 40, at 15. 
47. This analysis, which acknowledges anti-diserimination law as primarily the regulation of 
speech, is to be contrasted with the defense of pornography regulation that seeks to characterize the 
regulation of pornographic speech as the regulation of conduct. See MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue. 
2 YALE L. & POL'y REV. 321, 340 (1984). 
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The public accommodations provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 
196448 provide another example illuminating why laws against discrimi-
nation are also regulation of racist speech. The legislative history and the 
Supreme Court's opinions upholding the Act establish that Congress was 
concerned that blacks have access to public accommodations to eliminate 
impediments to the free flow of interstate commerce,49 but this purpose 
could have been achieved through a regime of separate-but-equal accom-
modations. Title II goes further; it incorporates the principal of the in-
herent inequality of segregation, and prohibits restaurant owners from 
providing separate places at the lunch counter for "whites" and 
"coloreds." Even if the same food and the same service are provided, 
separate-but-equal facilities are unlawful. If the signs indicating separate 
facilities remain in place, then the statute is violated despite proof that 
restaurant patrons are free to disregard the signs. so Outlawing these 
signs graphically illustrates my point that anti-discrimination laws are 
primarily regulations of the content of racist speech. 
Another way to understand the inseparability of racist speech and 
discriminatory conduct is to view individual racist acts as part of a total-
ity. When viewed in this manner, white supremacists' conduct or speech 
is forbidden by the equal protection clause.Sl The goal of white 
48. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000a-6 (1988). 
49. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upheld Congress' 
authority under the commerce clause to compel owners of private property to grant access to indi-
viduals whom they wish to exclude); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (same). 
SO. See D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW (2nd ed. 1980). Bell suggests that any 
"decorative changes designed to maintain prior discriminatory policies" may be enjoined as a viola-
tion of Title II as a result of United States v. Boyd, 327 F. Supp. 998 (S.D. Ga. 1971). D. BELL, 
supra, af 100-01. See also Green v. County School Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
The Court in Green held that "fn desegregating a dual system a plan utilizing 'freedom of choice' is 
not an end in itself." Id. at 440. 
In the summer of 1966 Robert Cover and I were working as summer interns with C.B. King in 
Albany, Georgia. One day we stopped for lunch at a take-out chicken joint. The establishment was 
housed in a long diner-like structure with an awning extending from each of two doors in the side of 
the building. A sign was painted at the end of each awning. One said, "white" the other "colored." 
Bob and I entered the "white" side. When the proprietor took my order, I asked if he knew that the 
signs on his awnings were illegal under Title II of the Qvil Rights Act of 1964. He responded, 
"People can come in this place through any door they want to." What this story makes apparent is 
that the signs themselves constitute an injury that violates the anti-discrimination principle even 
when the conduct of denial of access is not present. 
51. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). According to Justice Strong, "The 
words of the amendment ... contain a necessary implication of positive immunity, or right .•• to the 
colored race-the right to exemption from unfriendly legislation against them distinctly as colored-
exemption from ... discriminations which are steps toward reducing them to the condition of a 
subject race." Id. at 307-08. Of course the equal protection clause only forbids governmental con-
duct that purposefully establishes or maintains white supremacy. But see infra notes 57-81 and 
accompanying text (deseribing how the state action doctrine distorts our understanding of this 
problem). 
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supremacy is not achieved by individual acts or even by the cumulative 
acts of a group, but rather it is achieved. by the institutionalization of the 
ideas of white supremacy. The institutionalization of white supremacy 
within our culture has created conduct on the societa1level that is greater 
than the sum of individual racist acts. The racist acts of millions of indi-
viduals are mutually reinforcing and cumulative because the status quo 
of institutionalized white supremacy remains long after deliberate racist 
actions subside. 52 
It is difficult to recognize the institutional significance of white 
supremacy or how it acts to harm, partially because of its Ubiquity. We 
simply do not see most racist conduct because we experience a wor1d in 
which whites are supreme as simply "the world." Much racist conduct is 
considered unrelated to race or regarded as neutral because racist con-
duct maintains the status quo, the status quo of the world as we have 
known it. Catharine MacKinnon has observed that "to the extent that 
pornography succeeds in constructing social reality, it becomes invisible 
as harm."53 Thus, pornography "is more act-like than thought-like."54 
This truth about gender discrimination is equally true of racism. 
Just because one can express the idea or message embodied by a 
practice such as white supremacy does not necessarily equate that prac-
tice with the idea. 55 Slavery was an idea as well as a practice, but the 
Court recognized the inseparability of idea and practice in the institution 
of slavery when it held the enabling clause of the thirteenth amendment 
clothed Congress with the power to pass "all laws necessary and proper 
for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States."56 
This understanding also informs the regulation of speech/conduct in the 
public accommodations provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 dis-
cussed above. When the racist restaurant or hotel owner puts a "whites 
only" sign in his window, his sign is more than speech. Putting up the 
52. Professor Kendall Thomas describes the way in which racism is simultaneously speech (a 
socially constructed meaning or idea) and conduct by asking us to consider the concept of "race" not 
as a noun but as a verb. He notes that race is a social construction. The meaning of "black" or 
"white" is derived through a history of acted-uPon ideology. Moreover, the cultural meaning of race 
continues to be promulgated through millions of ongoing contemporaneous speech/acts. Thus, he 
says, "we are raced." The social construction of race is an ongoing process. Comments of Kendall 
Thomas at panel on Critical Race Theory, conference on Frontiers of Legal Thought, Duke Law 
School, January 26, 1990. 
53. C. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 204 (1989). 
54. [d. 
55. [d. 
56. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3,20 (1883) (striking down the Civil Rights Act of 1875 
on the ground that the fourteenth amendment did not empower Congress to prohibit racial discrimi-
nation by innkeepers, railroads, and places of public amusement); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 
U.S. 409, 439 (1968) (upholding Congress' use of the "badge of servitude" idea to justify federal 
legislation prohibiting racially discriminatory practices by private persons). 
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sign is more than an act excluding black patrons who see the sign. The 
sign is part of the larger practice of segregation and white supremacy that 
constructs and maintains a culture in which non-whites are excluded 
from full citizenship. 57 The inseparability of the idea and practice of ra-
cism is central to Brown's holding that segregation is inherently 
unconstitutional. 
Racism is both 100% speech and 100% conduct.58 Discriminatory 
conduct is not racist unless it also conveys the message of white 
supremacy-unless it is interpreted within the culture to advance the 
structure and ideology of white supremacy. 59 Likewise, all racist speech 
constructs the social reality that constrains the liberty of non-whites be-
cause of their race. By limiting the life opportunities of others, this act of 
constructing meaning also makes racist speech conduct. 
B. The Public/Private Distinction 
There are critics who would contend that Brown is inapposite be-
cause the equal protection clause only restricts goverument behavior, 
whereas the first amendment protects the speech of private persons. 
They say, "Of course we want to prevent the state from defaming blacks, 
but we must continue to be vigilant about protecting the speech rights, 
even of racist individuals, from the government. In both cases our con-
cern must be protecting the individual from the unjust power of the 
state." 
At first blush, this position seems persuasive, but its persuasiveness 
relies upon the mystifying properties of constitutional ideology. In par-
ticular, I refer to the state action doctrine.60 By restricting the applica-
tion of the fourteenth amendment to discrimination implicating the 
57. See supra note 50 (story of "white" and "colored" signs). 
58. John Ely has made the same observation about all speech. See supra note 43. But I want to 
do more than merely convey the dilemma one faces in separating out the speech and conduct ele-
ments of communicative acts: I want to stress the complete overlap of the idea and practice of 
racism. 
59. For a discussion of how conduct that violates the equal protection clause might be identified 
by reference to its cultural meaning within the society, see Lawrence, supra note 20, at 355-62. 
60. Roughly stated, 
[T]he [state action] doctrine holds that although someone may have suffered harmful treat-
ment of a kind that one might ordinarily describe as a deprivation of liberty or a denial of 
equal protection of the laws, that occurrence excites no constitutional concern unless the 
proximate active perpetrators of the harm include persons exercising the special authority 
or power of the government of a state. 
Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional Argument: The Case of Pornogra-
phy Regulation, 56 TENN. L. REV. 291, 306 (1989). The doctrine embodies the notion in American 
life and law that racial discrimination ean be accurately and properly divided into two spheres, 
"public" and "private." See D. BELL, supra note 50, at 1Q4.1O. Karl Klare notes that the separa-
tion of state and Civil society became a centerpiece of all liberal political theory and was important in 
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government, the state action rule immunizes private discriminators from 
constitutional scrutiny. In so doing, it leaves untouched the largest part 
of the vast system of segregation in the United States. The Civil Rights 
Cases, in which this doctrine was firmly established, stands as a monu-
ment preserving American racial discrimination. Although the origin of 
state action is textual, countervailing values of privacy, freedom of asso-
ciation, and free speech all have been used to justify the rule's exculpa-
tion of private racism.61 
In the abstract, the right to make decisions about how we will edu-
cate our children or with whom we will associate is an important value in 
American society. But when we decontextualize by viewing this privacy 
value in the abstract, we ignore the way it operates in the real world.62 
We do not ask ourselves, for example, whether it is a value to which all 
persons have equal access. And we do not inquire about who has the 
resources to send their children to private school or move to an exclusive 
suburb.63 The privacy value, when presented as an ideal, seems an ap-
propriate limitation qn racial justice because we naively believe that eve-
ryone has an equal stake in this value. 
the development of American constitutionalism. Klare's analysis shows how the state action limita-
tion of the fourteenth amendment pennitted a system of social and economic domination by prohib-
iting only those evils that could be direetly conneeted to the intentional exercise of state power. 
Entities such as corporations, universities, and labor unions are treated as private although their 
actions are public in scope and character. Klare, The Quest for Industrial Democracy and the Strug-
gle Against Racism: Perspectives from Labor Law and Civil Rights Law. 61 OR. L. REV. 157 (1982) 
(discussion of the structural similarities between the limitations contained in labor law and civil 
rights law). Klare argues that: 
[T]he practices constituting the "private sphere" of social and economic life are inextrica-
bly linked to and partially constituted by the rule oflaw. By the same token law is imbued 
with, when not captured by, the power relationships ofsQCiallife. The law simply does not 
stand apart from the hierarchy of social life. Law and polities are implicated in the class 
and racial domination that characterize American society. There is no "core" or "infra-
structure" of social or economic life that ean be meaningfully described without reference 
to the role oflaw. 
Id. at 183 (footnotes omitted). 
61. Thus it is argued that a white family's decision to send its children to private school or to 
move to a racially exclusive suburb should be accorded respect in spite of the fourteenth amend-
ment's requirement of nondiscrimination because these decisions are part of the right to individual 
familial autonomy. In this way, the state action rule's rather arbitrary limit on the scope of the anti-
discrimination principle is transfonned into a right of privacy-which is presented as the constitu-
tional embodiment of an affinnative, neutral, and universally shared value. A new and positive 
image emerges-an image that has been abstracted from its original context. 
62. I do not mean to suggest that privacy or autonomy has no nonnative value; there is some 
point at which the I)alance ought to be struck in its favor after full consideration of the inequities that 
might accompany that choice. What is.objection~ble about the privacy language that I am discussing 
here is that it ignores inequities and assumes we all share equally in the value being promoted. 
63. The Court's treatment of the a~rtion controversy provides the most striking example of 
the fact that the right of autonomous choice is not shared by rich and poor alike. In Roc v. Wade, 
410 U.S. 113 (1973), the Court declared, in no uncertain tenns, that the right of privacy "is broad 
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to tenninate her pregnancy." Id. at 153. 
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The argument that distinguishes private racist speech from the gov-
ernment speech outlawed by Brown suffers from the same decontextual-
izing ideology. If the government is involved in a joint venture with 
private contractors to engage in the business of defaming blacks, should 
it be able to escape the constitutional mandate that makes that business 
illegal simply by handing over the copyright and the printing presses to 
its partners in crime? I think not. And yet this is the essence of the 
position that espouses first amendment protection for those partners. 
In an insightful article considering the constitutional implications of 
government regulation of pornography, Frank Michelman has observed 
that the idea of state action plays a crucial, if unspoken, role for judges 
and civil libertarians who favor an absolute rule against government reg-
ulation of private pornographic publications (or racist speech), even 
when that expression is causative "of effects fairly describable ... as 
deprivations of liberty and denials of equal protection of the laws."64 He 
notes that judges and civil libertarians would not balance the evils of 
private subversions of liberty and equal protection against the evils of 
government censorship because "the Constitution, through the state ac-
tion doctrine, in effect tells them not to."65 Michelman suggests that the 
state action doctrine, by directing us to the text of the fourteenth amend-
ment, diverts our attention from the underlying issue-whether we 
should balance the evils of private deprivations of liberty against the gov-
ernment deprivations of liberty that may arise out of state regulations 
designed to avert those private deprivations. 
When a person responds to the argument that Brown mandates the 
abolition of racist speech by reciting the state action doctrine, she fails to 
consider that the alternative to regulating racist speech is infringement of 
the claims of blacks to liberty and equal protection.66 The best way to 
Yet, in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), the Court with equal certainty asserted that "it simply 
does not follow that a woman's freedom of choice carries with it a constitutional entitlement to the 
financial resources to avail herself of the full range of protected choices." Id. at 316. 
64. See Michelman, supra note 60, at 306-07 (reflecting on the ambiguities in American consti-
tutionallegal thought concerning the governmental regulation of pornography). 
65. Id. 
66. Id. at 307. Michelman further argues that once the constitutional problem is properly 
posed it is far from obvious that the state commits the forbidden deprivation or denial by choosing 
the regulatory alternative. 
[S]o long as the state can fairly support a judgment that the infringements of liberty and 
equal protection consequent upon its choice for regulation of pornography are, in some 
appropriate sense, lesser than the infringements of liberty and equal protection consequent 
upon the opposite choice to leave pornography unregulated, that pro-regulation choice by 
the state would seem to come as close as humanly possible to good-faith compliance with 
the constitutional mandate. For the state simply to disregard the subversions of liberty and 
equal protection consequent upon a choice not to regulate-to set them aside as of no 
account-when it knows about those subversions and knows, too, how to avoid them by 
regulating, is for the state to choose to incur those subversions and thereby to cause them 
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constitutionally protect these competing interests is to balance them di-
rectly. To invoke the state action doctrine is to circumvent our value 
judgment as to how these competing interests should be balanced. 67 
The deference usually given to the first amendment values in this 
balance is justified using the argument that racist speech is unpopular 
speech, that, like the speech of civil rights activists, pacifists, and reli-
gious and political dissenters, it is in need of special protection from 
majoritarian censorship. But for over three hundred years, racist speech 
has been the liturgy of America's leading established religion, the religion 
of racism. Racist speech remains a vital and regrettably popular charac-
teristic of the American vernacular.68 It must be noted that there has not 
yet been satisfactory retraction of the government-sponsored defamation 
in the slavery clauses,69 the Dred Scott decision,70 the black codes, the 
segregation statutes, and countless other group libels. The injury to 
blacks is hardly redressed by deciding the government must no longer 
injure our reputation if one then invokes the first amendment to ensure 
that racist speech continues to thrive in an unregulated private market. 71 
Consider, for example, the case of McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Re-
gents, 72 where the University of Oklahoma graduate school, under order 
by even the strictest notions of legal causation. The issue of the state's liability for the 
resulting harm thus leaves behind the question of causation, to confront instead the ques-
tion of justilication by countervailing responsibilities, interests, or values (in this case con-
sisting of the pornographer's claims to liberty and equal protection). On this analysis, the 
state's constitutional obligation would be to compare the constitutional values respectively 
at risk in the options that it confronts. The corresponding duty of a reviewing court would 
be to ascertain, within the limits of judicial institutional competence, whether the state has 
done so responsibly and in good faith. 
[d. at 307-09 (footnotes omitted). 
MacKinnon takes the argument a step farther, arguing that: 
The most basic assumption underlying First Amendment adjudication is that, socially, 
speech is frec. . .. Frec speech exists. The problem for government is to avoid constraining 
that which, if unconstrained by government, is frec. This tends to presuppose that whole 
segments of the population are not systematically silenced socially prior to government 
action. 
MacKinnon, supra note 47, at 340. 
67. Alan Freeman has described how much of civil rights law disguises value conflicts between 
victim and perpetrator groups by illustrating what is at stake in decontextualized neutral terms like 
"color blind" and "privacy." Freeman, School Desegregation Law: Promise, Contradiction, Ration-
alization, in SHADES OF BROWN: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 70 (D. Bell ed. 
1980). 
68. Mari Matsuda gives us a small but powerful sampling of the millions of stories of racist 
verbal assault that could be told by victims of those assaults. Matsuda, supra note 25, at 2326-31. 
69. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; id. § 9, cl. I; id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3. 
70. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
71. If one insists on maintaining the state action distinction, then it might well be argued that 
under Shelly v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), there is state action when the lirst amendment is invoked 
to proteet racist lighting words that would not otherwise be proteeted. 
72. 339 U.S. 637 (1950). 
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by a federal court to admit McLaurin, a black student, designated a spe-
cial seat, roped off from other seats, in each classroom, the library, and 
the cafeteria. The Supreme Court held that this arrangement was uncon-
stitutional because McLaurin could not have had an equal opportunity to 
learn and participate if he were humiliated and symbolically stigmatized 
as an untouchable. Would it be any less injurious if all McLaurin's class-
mates had shown up at the class wearing blackface? Should this sym-
bolic speech be protected by the constitution? Yet, according to a Time 
magazine report, last fall at the University of Wisconsin "members of the 
Zeta Beta Tau fraternity staged a mock slave auction, complete with 
some pledges in blackface."73 More recently, at the same university, 
white male students trailed black female students shouting, 'I've never 
tried a nigger before.' "74 These young women were no less severely in-
jured than was Mr. McLaurin simply because the University did not di-
rectly sponsor their assault. If the University fails to protect them in 
their right to pursue their education free from this kind of degradation 
and humiliation, then surely there are constitutional values at stake. 
It is a very sad irony that the first instinct of many civil libertarians 
has been to express concern for possible infringement of the assailants' 
liberties while barely noticing the constitutional rights of the assailed. 
Shortly after Brown, many southern communities tried to escape the 
mandate of desegregation by closing public schools and opening private 
(white) academies. These attempts to avoid the fourteenth amendment 
through the privatization of discrimination consistently were invalidated 
by the courts.7S In essence, the Supreme Court held that the defamatory 
message of segregation would not be insulated from constitutional pro-
scription simply because the speaker was a non-government entity. 
The Supreme Court also has indicated that Congress may enact leg-
islation regulating private racist speech. In upholding the public accom-
modations provisions of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 196476 in 
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, the Court implicitly rejected the 
argument that the absence of state action meant that private discrimina-
tors were protected by first amendment free speech and associational 
73. A Step Toward Civility, TIME, May 1, 1989, at 43. 
74. Id. 
75. See Griffin v. Prince Edward County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (ordering a county 
school system reopened; five years earlier it had been closed to avoid desegregation); Norwood v. 
Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973) (preventing a state from lending textbooks to students attending pri· 
vate white academies); see also Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (interpreting 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1981 (1988) to outlaw race discrimination by private schools). 
76. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a, 2000a·l to 2000a·6 (1988). 
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rights.77 Likewise in Bob Jones University v. United States,78 the court 
sustained the Internal Revenue Service's decision to discontinue tax ex-
empt status for a college with a policy against interracial dating and mar-
riage. The college framed its objection in terms of the free exercise of 
religion, since their policy was religiously motivated, but the Supreme 
Court found that the government had "a fundamental, overriding inter-
est in eradicating racial discrimination in education" that "substantially 
outweighs whatever burden denial of tax benefits"79 placed on the col-
lege's exercise of its religious beliefs. It is difficult to believe that the 
University would have fared any better under free speech analysis or if 
the policy had been merely a statement of principle rather than an en-
forceable disciplinary regulation.80 Regulation of private racist speech 
also has been held constitutional in the context of prohibition of race-
desiguated advertisements for employees, home sales, and rentals.81 
Thus Brown and the anti-discrimination law it spawned provide pre-
cedent for my position that the content regulation of racist speech is not 
only permissible but may be required by the Constitution in certain cir-
cumstances. This precedent may not mean that we should advocate the 
government regulation of all racist speech, but it should give us pause in 
assuming absolutist positions about regulations aimed at the message or 
idea such speech conveys. If we understand Brown-the cornerstone of 
the civil rights movement and equal protection doctrine---correctly, and 
if we understand the necessity of disestablishing the system of signs and 
symbols that signal blacks' inferiority, then we ~hould not proclaim that 
all racist speech that stops short of physical violence must be defended. 
II. RACIST SPEECH AS THE FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT OF 
FIGHTING WORDS 
Much recent debate over the efficacy of regulating racist speech has 
focused on the efforts by colleges and universities to respond to the bur-
geoning incidents of racial harassment on their campuses. At Stanford, 
77. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964); see'also Roberts v. 
United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 624 (1984) (COurt upheld the public accommodations provision 
of the Minnesota Human Rights Act). The Roberts Court explicitly rejected the freedom of associa-
tion argument stating that "[t]he right to associate for expressive purposes is not, however, absolute. 
Infringements on that right may be justified by regulations adopted to serve compelling state inter-
ests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through mcans signifieantly less 
restrictive of associational freedoms." [d. at 623. 
78. 461 U.S. 574, 595 (1983). 
79. [d. at 604. 
80. [d.; see also Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 173-75 (1976) (interpreting 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1981 (1988) to outlaw race discrimination by private schools). 
81. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations 413 U.S. 376 (1973) (up-
holding the regulation of sex designated "Help Wanted" advertising). 
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where I teach, there has been considerable controversy over the questions 
whether racist and other discriminatory verbal harassment should be reg-
ulated and what form that regulation should take. Proponents of regula-
tion have been sensitive to the danger of inhibiting expression, and the 
current regulation (which was drafted by my colleague Tom Grey) 
manifests that sensitivity. It is drafted somewhat more narrowly than I 
would have preferred, leaving unregulated hate speech that occurs in set-
tings where there is a captive audience, speech that I would regulate. But 
I largely agree with this regulation'S substance and approach.82 I include 
it here as one example of a regulation of racist speech that I would argue 
violates neither first amendment precedent nor principle. The regulation 
reads as follows: 
Fundamental Standard Interpretation: Free Expression and Discrimi-
natory Harassment 
1. Stanford is committed to the principles of free inquiry and free ex-
pression. Students have the right to hold and vigorously defend and 
promote their opinions, thus entering them into the life of the Uni-
versity, there to flourish or wither according to their merits. Re-
spect for this right requires that students tolerate even expression of 
opinions which they find abhorrent. Intimidation of students by 
other students in their exercise of this right, by violence or threat of 
violence, is therefore considered to be a violation of the Fundamen-
tal Standard. 
2. Stanford is also committed to principles of equal opportunity and 
non-discrimination. Each student has the right to equal access to a 
Stanford education, without discrimination on the basis of sex, race, 
color, handicap, religion, sexual orientation, or national and ethnic 
origin. Harassment of students on the basis of any of these charac-
teristics contributes to a hostile environment that makes access to 
education for those subjected to it less than equal. Such discrimina-
tory harassment is therefore considered to be a violation of the Fun-
damental Standard. 
3. This interpretation of the Fundamental Standard is intended to 
clarify the point at which protected free expression ends and pro-
hibited discriminatory harassment begins. Prohibited harassment 
includes discriminatory intimidation by threats of violence, and also 
includes personal vilification of students on the basis of their sex, 
race, color, handicap, religion, sexual orientation, or national and 
ethnic origin. 
4. Speech or other expression constitutes harassment by personal vilifi-
cation if it: 
82. I supported a proposal which would have been broader in scope by prohibiting speech of 
this nature in all common areas, excepting organized and announced rallies and speeches. It would 
have been narrower in its protection in that it would not have protected persons who were vilified on 
the basis of their membership in dominant majority groups. 
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aj is intended to insult or stigmatize an individual or a small 
number' of individuals on the basis of their sex, race, color, hand-
icap, religion, sexual orientation, or national and ethnic origin; 
and 
b) is addressed directly to the individual or individuals whom it 
insults or stigmatizes; and 
c) makes use of insulting or "fighting" words or non-verbal 
symbols. 
In the context of discriminatory harassment by personal vilification, 
insulting or "fighting" words or non-verbal symbols are those "which 
by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite to an immediate 
breach of the peace," and which are commonly understood to convey 
direct and visceral hatred or contempt for human beings on the basis 
of their sex, race, color, handicap, religion, sexual orientation, or na-
tional and ethnic origin. 83 
451 
This regulation and others like it have been characterized in the 
press as the work of "thought police,"84 but it does nothing more than 
prohibit intentional face-to-face insults, a form of speech that is unpro-
tected by the first amendment. When racist speech takes the form of 
face-to-face insults, catcalls, or other assaultive speech aimed at an indi-
vidual or small group of persons, then it falls within the "fighting words" 
exception to first amendment protection.85 The Supreme Court has held 
83. Fundamental Standard Interpretation: Free Expression and Discriminatory Harassment, 
adopted by Stanford University June 1990. 
It is important to recognize that this regnlation is not content neutral. It prohibits "discrimina-
tory harassment" rather than just plain harassment and it regulates only discriminatory harassment 
based on "sex, race, color, handicap, religion, sexual orientation, and national or ethnic origin." It is 
arguably viewpoint neutral with respect to these categories, although its reference to "words ... 
which by their very utterance inflict injury ... and which are commonly understood to convey direct 
and visceral hatred or contempt" probably means that there will be many more epithets that refer to 
subordinated groups than there will be words that refer to superordinate groups covered by the 
regulation. 
84. Numerous news commentators have labeled as censorship any attempt to regulate verbal 
harassment: "Stanford's program of speech patrol is hardly the worst •... " Leo, Legal Cornercur-
ring Slices Away Civil Libenies, Rocky Mountaiu News, June 21, 1989, at 11, col. 6; "[Lawrence's 
argument] exemplifies the ongoing attempt to give intellectual respectability to the spreading move-
ment of censorship by liberals on campuses." Will, supra note 19; "This is not the first time in recent 
years that some on the left have sought to silence those who disagree with them." Dembart, supra 
note 17. 
85. The flghting words doctrine requires that the words be "direeted to the person of the 
hearer." Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. IS, 20 (1971). This requirement strikes a balance between 
our concern for protecting the individual from unavoidable personalized attack (one is not given an 
opportunity to avoid the speech by averting the eyes or leaving the room) and our concern for 
allowing space for even the most offensive speech in a public forum ("one man's vulgarity is an-
other's lyric," id. at 25). I would argue that the face-to-face requirement be expanded in the case of 
racist verbal assaults to include those words that are intentionally spoken in the presence of members 
of the denigrated group. See infra notes 87-103 and accompanying text. 
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that words that "by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an 
immediate breach of the peace"86 are not constitutionally protected. 
Face-to-face racial insults, like fighting words, are undeserving of 
first amendment protection for two reasons. The first reason is the im-
medi~cy of the injurious impact of racial insults. The experience of being 
called "nigger," "spic," "Jap," or "kike" is like receiving a slap in the 
face. The injury is instantaneous. There is neither an opportunity for 
intermediary reflection on the idea conveyed87 nor an opportunity for 
responsive speech. The harm to be avoided is both clear and present. 
The second reason that racial insults should not fall under protected 
speech relates to the purpose underlying the first amendment. If the pur-
pose of the first amendment is to foster the greatest amount of speech, 
then racial insults disserve that purpose. Assaultive racist speech func-
tions as a preemptive strike. The racial invective is experienced as a 
blow, not a proffered idea, and once the blow is struck, it is unlikely that 
dialogue will follow. Racial insults are undeserving of first amendment 
protection because the perpetrator's intention is not to discover truth or 
initiate dialogue but to injure the victim.88 
The fighting words doctrine anticipates that the verbal "slap in the 
face" of insulting words will provoke a violent response with a resulting 
breach of the peace. When racial insults are hurled at minorities, the 
response may be silence or flight rather than a fight, but the preemptive 
effect on further speech is just as complete as with fighting words.89 Wo-
men and minorities often report that they find themselves speechless in 
the face of discriminatory verbal attacks. This inability to respond is not 
the result of oversensitivity among these groups, as some individuals who 
oppose protective regulation have argued. Rather, it is the product of 
several factors, all of which reveal the non-speech character of the initial 
preemptive verbal assault. The first factor is that the visceral emotional 
response to personal attack precludes speech. Attack produces an in-
stinctive, defensive psychological reaction. Fear, rage, shock, and flight 
all interfere with any reasoned response. Words like "nigger," "kike," 
and "faggot" produce physical symptoms that temporarily disable the 
victim, and the perpetrators often use these words with the intention of 
86. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
87. A defining attribute of speech is that it appeals first to the mind of the hearer who can 
evaluate its truth or persuasiveness. The use of racial epithets lacks this quality; it is a form of 
"violence by speech." See J. Denver & J. Powell, Caliban's Complaint: Racist Speech and the First 
Amendment, (unpublished manuscript) (available from author). 
88. See Arkes, supra note 28, at 331; Delgado, supra note 28, at 175. 
89. It should not be necessary to urge victims of these insulting attacks to carry arms so that 
the "fighting words" rationale of these assaults can be more easily perceived by whites. 
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producing this effect. Many victims do not find words of response until 
well after the assault when the cowardly assaulter has departed. 
A second factor that distinguishes racial insults from protected 
speech is the preemptive nature of such insults-the words by which to 
respond to such verbal attacks may never be forthcoming because speech 
is usually an inadequate response. When one is personally attacked with 
words that denote one's subhuman status and untouchability, there is 
little (if anything) that can be said to redress either the emotional or 
reputational injury. This is particularly true when the message and 
meaning of the epithet resonates with beliefs widely held in socieW.90 
This preservation of widespread beliefs is what makes the face-to-face 
racial attack more likely to preempt speech than are other fighting 
words. The racist name-caller is accompanied by a cultural chorus of 
equally demeaning speech and symbols.91 
The subordinated victim of fighting words also is silenced by her 
relatively powerless position in society. Because of the significance of 
power and position, the categorization of racial epithetS as "fighting 
words" provides an inadequate paradigm; instead one must speak of their 
"functional equivalent. "92 The fighting words doctrine presupposes an 
90. I have discussed this phenomena in some detail in two articles that explore the nature of the 
injury of segregation and other racially stigmatizing actions. Segregation and other forms of racist 
speech injure victims because of their dehumanizing and excluding message. But each individual 
message gains its power because of the cumulative and reinforcing effect of countless similar 
messages that are conveyed in a society where racism is ubiquitous. See Lawrence, supra note 40, at 
33.40; Lawrence, supra note 20; see also Karst, The Costs of Motive·Centered Inquiry. 15 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 1163, 1163·66 (1978) (constitutional equal protection doctrine should focus on the pervasive 
social problem of racial inequality). 
91. Marl Matsuda has noted that in framing a legal response to racist speech one must consider 
its role within the structural reality of racism in America. 
The implements of racism include: 1. Violence and Genocide; 2. Racial hate messages, 
disparagement, and threats; 3. Overt disparate treatment; and 4. Covert disparate 
treatment ...• 
From the victim's perspective, all of these implements inflict wounds, wounds that are 
neither random nor isolated. Gutter racism, parlor racism, corporate racism, and govern-
ment racism work in coordination, reinforcing existing conditions of domination. 
Matsuda, supra note 25, at 2332-35. 
92. Some civil libertarians will respond to my use of the "fighting words" dOctrine by arguing 
that the doctrine itself is not good law. They will note that the reasoning in Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), has been implicitly abandoned, see Strossen, supra note *, at 509-
10. Civil libertarians have always been critical of a doctrine which allows those who object to un-
popular speech to exercise a veto on that speech by the threat of resort to violence. In response to 
the first point, I would note that at least as recently as Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), the 
Court indicated the continuing vitality of Chap/insky in the context of face-to-face insults. In Cohen. 
the Court held that "the states are free to ban the simple use, without a demonstration of additional 
justifying circumstances, of so-called 'fighting words,' those personally abusive epithets which, when 
addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to pro-
voke violent reaction." Id. at 20. More importantly, I am in substantial agreement with the civil 
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encounter between two persons of relatively equal power who have been 
acculturated to respond to face-to-face insults with violence. The fight-
ing words doctrine is a paradigm based on a white male point of view.93 
In most situations, minorities correctly perceive that a violent response 
to fighting words will result in a risk to their own life and limb. Si~ce 
minorities are likely to lose the fight, they are forced to remain silent and 
submissive.94 This response is most obvious when women submit to sex-
ually assaultive speech or when the racist name-caller is in a more power-
ful position-the boss on the job or the mob. Certainly, we do not expect 
the black women crossing the Wisconsin campus to tum on their tor-
mentors and pummel them. Less obvious, but just as significant, is the 
effect of pervasive racial and sexual violence and coercion on individual 
libertarians who would not cease to protect speech that increases the propensity to violence of those 
who oppose the speech. Paradoxically, it is this clear and present danger of violence rationale that 
Professor Strossen cites as the part of the fighting words doctrine that remains good law. See Stros-
sen, supra note *, at 509-10. It also is worth noting that virtually every case in which the Court 
reversed the conviction of persons charged with using offensive language directed at an individual, 
the reversal was based on the overbreadth of the statute and the potentially offended party was in a 
position of relative power when compared with the speaker. See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 
U.S. 901 (1972); Lewis v. New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913 (1972); Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 914 
(1972). A majority of the Supreme Court was willing to vacate and remand those convictions for use 
of offensive language. But there is an alternative rationale for the "fighting words" doctrine that is 
more sound. Speech that precmpts further speech rather than inviting response does not serve the 
purposes of the first amendment and is therefore less deserving of protection. Furthermore, I believe 
that racists' fighting words and other face-ta-face verbal assaults against persons from subordinated 
groups more closely fit this rationale than do garden variety fighting words. 
93. The fighting words doctrine captures the "macho" quality of male discourse. It is accepted, 
justifiable, and even praiseworthy when "rcal men" respond to personal insult with violence. (Presi-
dential candidate George Bush did well to emulate the most macho, and not coincidentally violent, 
of movie stars, Clint Eastwood, when he repeatedly used the phrase, "Read my Iipsl" Any teenage 
boy will tell you the subtext of this message: "I've got nothing else to say about this and if you don't 
like what I'm saying we can step outside.") The fighting words doctrine's responsiveness to this 
"male" stance in the world and its blindness to the cultural experience of women is another example 
of how "neutral" prineiples of law often reflect the values of those who are dominant. Black males 
also are well aware of the dOUble standard that our culture applies to black and white men in re-
sponding to insult. Part of the culture of racial domination through violence-a culture of domi-
nance that manifested itself in thousands of lynchings in the south and more recently in the raeial 
violence at Howard Beach and Bensonhurst-is the paradoxical expectation on the part of whites 
that black males will accept insult from whites without protest, yet they will become violent without 
provocation. These expectations combine two assumptions: First, that blacks as a group-and espe-
cially black males-are more violent and, second, that, as inferior persons, blaeks have no right to 
feel insulted. One can only imagine the response of universities if black males started to respond to 
racist fighting words by beating up white students. 
94. It is both uncommon and unlikely that whites will insult minorities with racial epithets in 
contexts where they are outnumbered or overmatched. Racial name calling is usually a sport en-
gaged in by cowards who are certain of their ability to win the fight before they inflict the first blow. 
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members of subordinated groups who must learn the survival techniques 
of suppressing and disguising rage and anger at an early age.95 
One of my students, a white, gay male, related an experience that is 
quite instructive in understanding the inadequacy and potential of the 
"fighting words" doctrine. In response to my request that students de-
scribe how they experienced the injury of racist speech, Michael told a 
story of being called "faggot" by a man on a subway. His description 
included all of the speech inhibiting elements I have noted previously. 
He found himself in a state of semi-shock, nauseous, dizzy, unable to 
muster the witty, sarcastic, articulate rejoinder he was accustomed to 
making. He suddenly was aware of the recent spate of gay-bashing in 
San Francisco, and how many of these had escalated from verbal en-
counters.96 Even hours later when the shock resided and his facility with 
words returned, he realized that any response was inadequate to counter 
the hundreds of years of societal defamation that one word-''faggot''-
carried with it. Like the word "nigger" and unlike the word "liar," it is 
not sufficient to deny the truth of the word's application, to say, "I am 
not a faggot." One must deny the truth of the word's meaning, a mean-
ing shouted from the rooftops by the rest of the world a million times a 
day.97 Although there are many of us who constantly and in myriad 
ways seek to counter the lie spoken in the meaning of hateful words like 
"nigger" and "faggot," it is a nearly impossible burden to bear when one 
encounters hateful speech face-to-face. 
But there was another part of my discussion with Michael that is 
equally instructive. I asked if he could remember a situation when he 
had been verbally attacked with reference to his membership in a super-
ordinate group. Had he ever been called a "honkie," a "chauvinist pig," 
or "mick"? (Michael is from a working class Irish family in Boston.) He 
said that he had been called so~e version of all three and that although 
95. For a discussion of submissiveness as a psychological defense, see Guthrie, White Racism 
and Its Impact on Black and White Behavior, 1 JOURNAL OF NON-WHITE CONCERNS IN PERSON-
NEL AND GUIDANCE 144 (1973). See also C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING 
WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979); S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: 
MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE (1975). 
96. The National Gay and Lesbian Task Force includes verbal harassment among its categories 
of anti-gay violence. Hatfield, Attacks on Gays Rising, San Francisco Examiner, June 7, 1989, at 
AID, col. 2. Matsuda notes that racial violence is typically preceded by racist propaganda. Mat-
suda, supra note 25, at 2335-41. 
97. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). Chief Justice Burger, in his now infamous 
concurrence, quoting Blackstone'S characterization of sodomy "as an offense of 'deeper malignity' 
than rape, a heinous act 'the very mention of which is a disgrace to human nature,'" urged the 
Court to defer to the "millennia of moral teaching." Id. at 197. Mary Dunlap has called this one of 
the "gifts" of the Hardwick case-the recorded and published admission by the Supreme Court that 
we live in a profoundly homophobic nation. Remarks by Mary Dunlap, Stanford Law School sym-
posium on Bowers v. Hardwick (May 8, 1989). 
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he found the last one more offensive than the first two, he had not exper-
ienced---even in that subordinated role-the same disorienting 
powerlessness he had experienced when attacked for his membership in 
the gay community. The question of power, of the context of the power 
relationships within which speech takes place, must be considered as we 
decide how best to foster the freest and fullest dialogue within our com-
munities. It is apparent that regulation of face-to-face verbal assault in 
the manner contemplated by the Stanford provision98 will make room for 
more speech than it chills. The provision is clearly within the spirit, if 
not the letter, of existing first amendment doctrine. 
The proposed Stanford regulation, and indeed regulations with con-
siderably broader reach, can be justified as ~ec~ssary to protect a captive 
audience from offensive or injurious speech. Courts have held that offen-
sive speech may not be regulated in public forums such as streets and 
parks where a listener may avoid the speec~ by moving on or averting his 
eyes,99 but the regulation of otherwise protected speech has been permit-
ted when the speech invades the privacy of the unwilling listener's home 
or when the unwilling listener cannot avoid the speech.1°O Racists pos-
ters, flyers, and graffiti in dorms, classrooms, bathrooms, and other com-
mon living spaces would fall within the reasoning of these cases. 
Minority students should not be required to remain in their rooms to 
avoid racial assault. 101 Minimally, they should find a safe haven in their 
dorms and other common rooms that are a part of their daily routine. I 
would argue that the university's responsibility for ensuring these stu-
dents received an equal educational opportunity provides a compelling 
justification for regulations that ensure them safe passage in all common 
98. See supra note 83 and accompanying teXt. 
99. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.s. 15,21 (1971) (holding that the state could not prohibit 
speech merely because it is offensive); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975) 
(overturning a city ordinance that deterred drive-in theaters from showing movies containing 
nudity). 
100. See Kovacks v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86 (1949) (right to free speech not abridged by city 
ordinance outlawing use of sound tracks on city streets); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 
(1978) (limited first amendment protection of broadcasting that extends into privacy of home); 
Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.s. 728, 736 (1970) (unwilling reeipient of sexually 
arousing material had right to instruct Postmaster General to 'cease mailings to protect recipient 
from unwanted communication of "ideas"). 
101. At Stanford two white students posted a Samba-like defacement of a Beethoven poster on a 
bulletin board outside of a black student's room in the black theme donn. The University'S office of 
general counsel held that the offending students could not be prosecuted under the University's 
fundamental standard because their actions constituted proteeted speech. Nowhere in their opinion 
did they mention the captive audience cases or the fact that the black students in this donn might 
have a justifiable expectation that they would not be subjeeted to this sort of vilification in what was 
now their home. Schwartz & Brest, First Amendment Principles and Prosecution for Offensive Ex-
pression under Stanford's Student DisCiplinary System. Stanford Daily, Feb. 8, 1989, at 9, col. 1. 
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areas. A black, latino, Asian or Native American student should not 
have to risk being the target of racially assaulting speech every time she 
chooses to walk across campus. 102 The regulation of vilifying speech that 
cannot be anticipated or avoided would not preclude announced speeches 
and rallies where minorities and their allies would have an opportunity to 
organize counter-demonstrations or avoid the speech altogether. 103 
III. KNOWING THE INJURY AND STRIKING THE BALANCE: 
UNDERSTANDING WHAT Is AT STAKE IN 
RACIST SPEECH CASES 
I argued in Part II that narrowly drafted regulations of racist speech 
that prohibit face-to-face vilification and protect captive audiences from 
verbal and written harassment can be defended within the confines of 
existing first amendment doctrine.' In this Part, I will argue that many 
civil libertarians who urge that the first amendment prohibits any regula-
tion of racist speech have given inadequate attention to the testimony of 
individuals who have experienced injury from such speech-these civil 
libertarians fail to comprehend both the nature and extent of the injury 
inflicted by racist speech. I further urge that understanding the injury 
requires reconsideration of the balance that must be struck between our 
concerns for racial equality and freedom of expression. 
The argument most commonly advanced against the regulation of 
racist speech goes something like this: We recognize that minority 
groups suffer pain and injury as the result of racist speech, but we must 
allow this hatemongering for the benefit of society as a whole. Freedom 
of speech is the lifeblood of our democratic system.104 It is a freedom 
102. According to Howard J. Ehrlich of the National Institute Against Prejudice and Violence, 
"[b]etween 20% and 25% of all minority students on campus have been victimized at least once 
during an academic year." Rieehmann, Colleges Tackle Increase in Racism on Campuses, L. A. 
Times, Apr. 30, 1989, Part I, at 36, col. 1. See also H. EHRLICH, supra note 18, at 41-72. 
103. Racist speakers planning organized events such as the Nazis march in Skokie or a spokes-
person for the Klan would not be precluded from obtaining a permit to march or speak at designated 
times and places. 
104. Marl Matsuda sets forth the core ideas upon which civil libertarians base their arguments: 
Democratic, representative government presumes that people are free to think and say 
whatever they might, even the unthinkable. They can advocate the end of democracy. We 
risk the chance that they will prevail because to give government the power to control 
expression is an even greater threat. . .. Thus, under our system, there is "na such thing as 
a false idea." ... When all ideas are voiced freely, we have the greatest chance that the 
right result will obtain. 
We havc no way of knowing what the right results are in advance .... We have no 
basis for distinguishing good from bad ideas, the only logical choice is to protect all ideas. 
Matsuda, supra note 25, at 2349-50 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1924» 
(footnotes omitted). This reasoning might suggest that possible truth is a reason for protecting racist 
speech. But, "[t]o their credit most civil libertarians avoid this rationale, arguing instead that racist 
lies must be protected in order to preservc frec speech for all." Id. at 2350 n.lSS. 
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that enables us to persuade others to our point of view. Free speech is 
especially important for minorities because often it is their only vehicle 
for rallying support for redress of their grievances. We cannot allow the 
public regulation of racist invective and vilification because any prohibi-
tion precise enough to prevent racist speech would catch in the same net 
forms of speech that are central to a democratic society.1°s 
Whenever we argue that racist epithets and vilification must be al-
lowed, not because we would condone them ourselves but because of the 
potential danger that precedent would pose for the speech of all dissent-
ers,106 we are balancing our concern for the free flow of ideas and the 
democratic process and our desire to further equality. This kind of cate-
gorical balance is struck whenever we frame any rule-even an absolute 
rule. lo7 It is important to be conscious of the nature and extent of injury 
to both concerns when we engage in this kind of balancing. In this case, 
we must place on one side of the balance the nature and extent of the 
injury caused by racism. We also must be very careful, in weighing the 
potential harm to free speech, to consider whether the racist speech we 
propose to regulate is advancing or retarding the values of the first 
amendment. 
A. Understanding the Injury Inflicted by Racist Speech 
There can be no meaningful discussion about how to reconcile our 
commitment to equality and our commitment to free speech until we 
acknowledge that racist speech inflicts real harm and that this harm is far 
105. There are two additional commonly advanced arguments against regulating racist speech. 
First, that such regulation is content-based government censorship of political speech. See, e.g •• 
Strossen, supra note *, at 534 (referring to the traditional prohibition on any content based regula-
tions); id. at 536 (noting that "if the freedom of speech is weakened for one person, group, or 
message, then it is no longer there for others"). See also L. TRIBE, supra note 43, § 12-8, at 832. 
Second, suppressing such speech will only force it underground and will do nothing to curb the more 
clandestine or subtle forms of discrimination, but when these ideas are given "fresh air" we can 
organize against them and ultimately they will be rejected. See, e.g., Strossen, supra note *, at 554 
(arguing that "censored speech becomes more appealing and persuasive to many listeners merely by 
virtue of the censorship"); id. at 560 (Regulation will "drive some racist thought and expression 
underground, where it would be more difficult to respond to such speech and the underlying atti-
tudes it expresses."). 
106. This precedent need not take the form of case law, it might also include general societal 
tolerance for the suppression of speech. 
107. For example the "actual malice" rule of New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 u.s. 254 (1964), 
and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), balances the state's interest in compensating 
public figures or private individuals for injury to their reputation against the first amendment interest 
in protecting matters of public interest. When public officials or public figures are involved, the rule 
shifts the balance struck betwecn these two interests in a direction that provides more room for 
speech. This shift recognizes both the concern for maximizing speech on public issues and the fact 
that public figures are more able to gain access to the media and respond than are private 
individuals. 
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from trivial. lOS I should state that more strongly: To engage in a debate 
about the first amendment and racist speech without a full understanding 
of the nature and extent of the harm of racist speech risks making the 
first amendment an instrument of domination rather than a vehicle of 
liberation. I09 Not everyone has known the experience of being victim-
ized by racist, misogynist, and homophobic speech, and we do not share 
equally the burden of the societal harm it inflicts. Often we are too quick 
to say we have heard the victims' cries when we have not; we are too 
eager to assure ourselves we have experienced the same injury, and there-
fore we can make the constitutional balance without danger of mis~ 
measurement. For many of us who have fought for the rights of 
oppressed minorities, it is difficult to accept that-by underestimating 
the injury from racist speech-we too. might be implicated in the vicious 
words we would never utter. Until we have eradicated racism and sex-
ism and no longer share in the fruits of those forms of domination, we 
cannot justly strike the balance over the protest of those who are domi-
nated. My plea is simply that we listen to the victims. 
Members of my own family were involved in a recent incident at a 
private school in Wilmington, Delaware that taught me much about both 
the nature of the injury racist speech inflicts and the lack of understand-
ing many whites have of that injury. 
As a good Quaker school dedicated to a deep commitment to and 
loving concern for all the members of its community, Wilmington 
Friends School also had been a haven for white families fleeing the court 
ordered desegregation of the Wilmington public schools. In recent years, 
the school strove to meet its commitment to human equality by enrolling 
a small (but significant) group of minority students and hiring an even 
smaller number of black faculty and staff. My sister Paula, a gifted, pas-
sionate, and dedicated teacher was the principal of the lower school. Her 
sons attend the high school. My brother-in-law, John, teaches geology at 
the University of Delaware. He is a strong, quiet, loving man, and he is 
white. My sister's family had moved to Wilmington shouldering the ex-
tra burdens and anxieties borne by an interracial family moving to a 
town where, not long ago, the defamatory message of segregation graced 
the doors of bathrooms and restaurants. Within a year they had made 
108. Mari Matsuda has made an important initial effort in relating some of the millions of stories 
that must be told before we can fully understand the nature and effect of the injury inflicted by racist 
speech. By placing these "victim's stories" beside the story told in traditional first amendment doc-
trine, Professor Matsuda demonstrates how one's analysis of an appropriate and just response to 
racist speech is impoverished by the omission of the victim's accounts. See Matsuda, supra note 25, 
at 2326-41. . 
109. See infra notes 153-55 and accompanying text (referring to my discussion of taxation with-
out representation). 
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their place as well-loved and respected members of the community, par-
ticularly the school community, where Paula was viewed as a godsend 
and my nephews had made many good friends. 
In May of their second year in Wilmington, an incident occurred 
that shook the entire school community but was particularly painful to 
my sister's family and others who found themselves the objects of hateful 
speech. In a letter to the school community explaining a decision to ex-
pel four students, the school's headmaster described the incident as 
follows: 
On Sunday evening, May 1, four students in the senior class met by 
prearrangement to paint the soccer kickboard, a flat rectangular struc-
ture, approximately 8 ft. by 25 ft., standing in the midst of the Wil-
mington Friends School playing fields. They worked for 
approximately one hour under bright moonlight and then went home. 
What confronted students and staff the following morning, de-
picted on the kickboard, were racist and anti-Semitic slogans and, most 
disturbing of all, threats of violent assault against one clearly identified 
member of the senior class. The slogans written on the kickboard in-
cluded "Save the land, join the Klan," and "Down with Jews"; among 
the drawings were at least twelve hooded Ku Klux Klansmen, Nazi 
swastikas, and a burning cross. The most frightening and disturbing 
depictions, however, were those that threatened violence against one of 
our senior black students. He was drawn, in cartoon figure, identified 
by his name, and his initials, and by the name of his mother. Directly 
to the right of his head was a bullet, and farther to the right was a gun 
with its barrel directed toward the head. Under the drawing of the 
student, three Ku Klux Klansmen were depicted, one of whom was 
saying that the student "dies." Next to the gun was a drawing of a 
burning cross under which was written "Kill the Tarbaby."llo 
When I visited my sister's family a few days after this incident, the 
injury they had suffered was evident. The wounds were fresh. My sister, 
a care-giver by nature and vocation, was clearly in need of care. My 
nephews were quiet. Their faces betrayed the aftershock of a recently 
inflicted blow and a newly discovered vulnerability. I knew the pain and 
scars were no less enduring because the injury had not been physical. 
And when I talked to my sister, I realized the greatest part of her pain 
came not from the incident itself but rather from the reaction of white 
parents who had come to the school in unprecedented numbers to protest 
the offending stpdents' expUlsion. "It was only a prank." "No one was 
physically attacked." "How can you punish these kids for mere words, 
mere drawings." Paula's pain was compounded by the failure of these 
people, with whom she had lived and worked, to recognize that she had 
110. Letter from Dulany O. Bennett to parents. alumni. and friends of the Wilmington Friends 
School (May 17. 1988). 
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been hurt, to understand in even the most limited way the reality of her 
pain and that of her family. 
Many people called the incident "isolated." But black folks know 
that no racial incident is "isolated" in America. That is what makes the 
incidents so horrible, so scary. It is the knowledge that they are not the 
isolated unpopular speech of a dissident few that makes them so frighten-
ing. These incidents are manifestations of an Ubiquitous and deeply in-
grained cultural belief system, an American way of life. I II Too often in 
recent months, as I have debated this issue with friends and colleagues, I 
have heard people speak of the need to protect "offensive" speech. The 
word offensive is used as if we were speaking of a difference in taste, as if 
I should learn to be less sensitive to words that "offend" me. 1l2 I cannot 
help but believe that those people who speak of offense-those who argue 
that this speech must go unchecked-do not understand the great differ-
ence between offense and injury: They have not known the injury my 
sister experienced, have not known the fear, vulnerability, and shame ex-
perienced by the Wisconsin coeds. There is a great difference between 
the offensiveness of words that you would rather not hear-because they 
are labeled dirty, impolite, or personally demeaning-and the injury in-
flicted by words that remind the world that you are fair game for physi-
cal attack, evoke in you all of the millions of cultural lessons regarding 
your inferiority that you have so painstakingly repressed, and imprint 
upon you a badge of servitude and subservience for all the world to see. 
It is instructive that the chief proponents for sanctioning people who in-
flict these injuries are women and people of color, and there are few 
among these groups who take the absolutist position that any regulation 
of this speech is too much. ll3 
III. Lawrence, supra note 20, at 330 ("[R]acism in America is much more complex than either 
the conscious conspiracy of a power elite or the simple delusion of a few ignorant bigots. It is part of 
our common historical experience and, therefore, a part of our culture."). 
112. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971 (holding that the state could not excise, as offensive 
conduct, particular epithets from public discourse) and FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) 
(upholding an FCC sanction against a radio station that broadcast an obscene monologue) are often 
cited at this point in the discussion. I think that Cohen was rightly decided and that the Court was 
wrong in Pacifica-curse words may shock and offend but they do not constitute a direct attack on 
the humanity of an individual or group. Moreover, curse words such as "shit" and "fuck" do not 
signal a set of beliefs concerning the inferiority, untouchability or legitimacy of exploiting a group 
that is SUbjected to systematic subordination. The exception to this, of course, is when the degrada-
tion of a particular subordinated group is contained in the meaning of the curse word, such as the 
word "cocksucker." 
113. When I presented an early version of this essay as a speech at the biennial convention of the 
ACLU, the support for my position from minority delegates was virtually unanimous. In the ensu-
ing plenary session, I do not recall a single minority delegate who spoke in opposition to the resolu-
tion that sought to frame a policy based on J;I1y paper's recommendations. 
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Again, Brown v. Board of Education is a useful case for our analysis. 
Brown is helpful because it articulates the nature of the injury inflicted by 
the racist message of segregation. When one considers the injuries identi-
fied in the Brown decision, it is clear that racist speech causes tangible 
injury, and it is the kind of injury for which the law commonly provides, 
and even requires, redress. 
Psychic injury is no less an injury than being struck in the face, and 
it often is far more severe. I 14 Brown speaks directly to the psychic injury 
inflicted by racist speech in noting that the symbolic message of segrega-
tion affected "the hearts and minds" of Negro children "in a way un-
likely ever to be undone."llS Racial epithets and harassment often cause 
deep emotional scarring, and feelings of anxiety and fear that pervade 
every aspect of a victim's life. Many victims of hate propaganda have 
experienced physiological and emotional symptoms ranging from rapid 
pulse rate and difficulty in breathing, to nightmares, post-traumatic stress 
disorder, psychosis and suicide.1l6 
A second injury identified in Brown, and present in my example, is 
reputational injury. "[L]ibelous speech was long regarded as a form of 
personal assault ... that"govemment,could vindicate ... without running 
afoul of the Constitution."1l7 Although New York Times v. Sullivan and 
its progeny have SUbjected much defamatory speech to constitutional 
scrutiny-on the reasoning that "debate on public issues should be unin-
hibited, robust and wide-open"1l8 and should not be "chilled" by the 
114. See Fisher v. Carousel Motor Motel, Inc., 424 S.W.2d 627, 630 (Tex. 1967) (award of $900 
for racial slur on assault and battery grounds upheld; battery protects dignity as well as physical 
security); Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'g, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 498, 468 P.2d 216, 218, 86 Cal. Rptr. 88, 90 
(1970) (use of "niggers" sufficient to state a cause of action for "extreme and outrageous" intentional 
infliction of emotional stress); Agarwal v. Johnson, 25 Cal. 3d 932, 94446, 603 P.2d 58, 66, 160 Cal. 
Rptr. 141, 148-49 (1979) (same). 
115. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). 
116. See Matsuda, supra note 25, at 2335-41 (physical and psychological harm of racist hate 
speech is significant). The effects of racial prejudice include displaced aggression, avoidance, retreat, 
and withdrawal, alcoholism and suicide. H. KITANO, RACE RELATIONS 69-85 (2d ed. 1974). See 
also Delgado, supra note 28, at 137-39 (noting, inter alia, high blood pressure, loss of self-worth, and 
special harm to children); G. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 142-60 (1954). Cj. Hafner, 
Psychological Disturbances Following Prolonged Persecution. 3 Soc. PSYCHIATRY 79 (1968) (discuss-
ing psychological symptoms including headaches, dizziness, social withdrawal, chronic depression 
and anxiety neurosis in survivors of extreme persecution); Denis, Race Harassment Discrimination: 
A Problem That Won't Go Away?, 10 EMPLOYMENT REL. L.J. 415, 432-35 (1984) (discussing dam-
ages for psychic injury in race harassment cases). 
117. L. TRIBE,supra note 43, § 12-12, at 861. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 
(1942) (classifying libel as wholly outside the scope of first amendment protection); Beauharnais v. 
Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (including group defamation among unprotected libelous statements). 
118. 376 U.S. 254, 270. 
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possibility of libel suits-these cases also demonstrate a concern for bal-
ancing the public's interest in being fully infonned with the competing 
interest of defamed persons in vindicating their reputation. I 19 
Brown is a case about group defamation. The message of segrega-
tion was stigmatizing to black children. To be labeled unfit to attend 
school with white children injured the reputation of black children, 
thereby foreclosing employment opportunities and the right to be re-
garded as respected members of the body politic. An extensive discus-
sion on the constitutionality or efficacy of group libel laws is beyond the 
119. Implicit in the Sullivan rule is the proposition that the first amendment establishes a right 
to speak defamatory truth. The Sullivan case, 
prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to 
his or her official conduct unless he or she proves that the statement was made with "actual 
malice"-that is, with knowledge that it was false or reckless disregard of whether it was 
false or not. 
[d. at 279-80. This privilege for good faith critics of government officials was created in order to 
protect against the self-censorship of the speaker who fears that he has guessed wrong in his effort to 
speak the truth. Lawrence Tribe notes that, "A rule that the first amendment protects the right to 
utter the truth clearly does not suffice, because 'erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate,' and 
the only guarantec of legal safety under such a rule is silence." See L. TRIBE, supra note 43, § 12-12, 
at 864 (quoting Sullivan. 376 U.S. at 271-72). 
But the self-censorship rational of Sullivan is inapplicable in cases involving speech which, 
rather than critiquing those in power, asserts the inferiority of an entire racially subordinated group. 
Sullivan is primarily a case about the unconstitutionality of labeling speech as seditious libel. It is 
concerned with censorship of criticism of government. The defamation of blacks or other racial 
minorities, as groups, does not involve criticism of government. Even when a racial epithet is used 
to attack a public official, the alleged inferiority of the racial group to which he belongs should not be 
held to be related to his fitness to hold the position. The individual who defames a racial group with 
racial epithets and stereotyped earicatures is not concerned that he may have "guessed wrong" in 
attempting to ascertain the truth. The racial epithet is the expression of a widely held belief. It is 
invoked as a statement of political belief-not as a statement of fact which may be proven true or 
erroneous. Moreover, if the Sullivan rule protects erroneous speech because of an ultimate concern 
for the discovery of truth, then the rule's application to racial epithets must be based on an accept-
ance of the possible "truth" of racism, a position which, happily, most first amendment absolutists 
are reluctant to embrace. Professor Matsuda argues that "we [should] accept certain principles as 
the shared historieallegacy of the world community. Racial supremacy is one of the ideas we have 
collectively and internationally considered and rejected." See Matsuda, supra note 25, at 2360. 
But Sullivan also held that "the central meaning of the first amendment is the profound na-
tional commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and 
wide open." 376 U.S. at 270. Some civil libertarians argue that the status and attributes of various 
racial groups are public issues about which vigorous debate should be encouraged. See Strossen, 
supra note *, at 560 (arguing that if "ugly" racist speech is chilled by university sanctions there will 
be less discussion about the underlying problems of racism). This proposition is combined with the 
proposition that there is no such thing as a false idea to argue that Sullivan has necessarily overruled 
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952). But are racial insults ideas? Do they encourage wide-
open debate? 
The solution might lie in establishing the equivalent of an actual malice requirement. Discus-
sions that attempt to explore an issue of public concern would be protected, but group defamations 
that intentionally vilify a group or individual for purposes of harassment or intimidation would 
receive no protection. 
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scope of this essay.120 However, it will suffice to note that whereas Beau-
hamais v. Illinois, 121 which upheld an Illinois group libel statute, has 
fallen into ill repute; 122 and is generally considered to have been over-
ruled implicitly by Sullivan, Brown remains an instructive case. By iden-
tifying the inseparability of discriminatory speech and action in the case 
of segregation, where the injury is inflicted by the meaning of the 
message, Brown limits the scope of Sullivan. 123 Brown reflects that ra-
cism is a form of subordination that achieves its purposes through group 
defamation. 124 
. The third injury identified in Brown is the denial of equal educa-
tional opportunity. Brown recognized that black children did not have 
an equal opportunity to learn and participate in the school community if 
they bore the additional burden of being subjected to the humiliation and 
120. There are compelling arguments to be made for the continuing viability and correctness of 
Beauhamais. See Arkes, Civility and the Restriction of Speech: Rediscovering the Defamation of 
Groups. 1974 SuP. Cr. REV. 281, 292 (One who rejects the notion of group libel must also reject that 
"certain minority groups in this country have in fact suffered injuries in the past as a result of racist 
stereotypes that have been perpetuated in the public mind."); see also Downs, Skokie Revisited: Hate 
Group Speech and the First Amendment, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 629, 661-66 (1985) (statutes 
similar to the one in Beauhamais unconstitutional unless the speech in question is racial vilification 
targeted at an individual or discrete group). 
121. 343 u.s. 250 (1952). 
122. See L. TRIBE, supro note 43, § 12-17, at 926-27. See also Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 
1205 (7th Cir. 1978) (questioning whether Beauhamais remains good law in the wake of the consti-
tutionallibel caSes), cert. denied. 439 u.s. 916 (1978). 
123. See supro notes 114-19 and accompanying text. The Court has recognized the inseparabil-
ity of discriminatory speech and conduct in sustaining the regulation of sexist (and presumably 
racist) speech in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Commission, 413 U.S. 376 (1973), where 
the Court held that sex-designated "help wanted" advertising columns could be prohibited since 
such ads "aided" unlawful sex discrimination in hiring. ld. at 389, 394. Similarly, regulation of 
"racist" advertising (or home sales and rentals has been upheld against free speech claims. 
124. For a discussion of the anti-discrimination principle of the equal protection clause and the 
centrality to that principle of the injury due to group defamation, see Lawrence, supra note 20, at 
350-51. He observ~ that: 
The prevention of stigma was at the core of the Supreme Court's unanimous declaration in 
Brown v. Board of Education that segregated public schools are inherently unequal. •.• 
The social meaning of racial segregation in the United States is the designation of a supe-
rior and an inferior caste, and segregation proceeds "on the ground that colored citizens 
are .•. inferior and degraded." 
Stigmatizing actions harm the individual in two ways: They inflict psychological in-
jury by assaulting a person's self-respect and human dignity, and they brand the individual 
with a sigu that signals her inferior status to others and designates her as an outcast. 
ld. (footnotes omitted). See also Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
107, 108, 129-70 (1976) (Common anti-discrimination doctrine is unduly limited to individualistic 
concerns, and to an assessment of the means as opposed to the ends of discrimination. A group 
disadvantaging principle would capture the equality ideal more completely). 
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psychic assault that accompanies the message of segregation. 125 Univer-
sity students bear an analogous burden when they are forced to live and 
work in an environment where, at any moment, they may be subjected to 
denigrating verbal harassment and assault. The testimony of non-white 
students about the detrimental effect of racial harassment on their aca-
demic performance and social integration in the college community is 
overwhelming. I26 A similar injury is recognized and addressed in Title 
VII's requirement that employers maintain a nondiscriminatory (non-
125. In explaining why segregated educational facilities were inherently unequal, the Brown 
Court said, "To separate [Negro children] from others of similar age and qualifications solely be-
cause of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may 
affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." 347 U.S. 483, 494. The Court 
went on to quote the federal district court in Kansas which had found that "[a] sense of inferiority 
[engendered by segregated schools] ... has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental devel-
opment of Negro children." Id. 
126. Report of President's Ad Hoc Committee on Racial Harassment, University of Texas at 
Austin, Nov. 27, 1989 (university president urged to initiate an investigation into the problem of 
racial harassment on the campus). The committee instituted hearings receiving both written and 
verbal testimony. 
[M]any speakers felt that they had experienced racism, resulting in deep feelings of per-
sonal anger, distress and isolation in the academic community. Such experiences produce 
alienation from, rather than a supportive relationship with, The University. They also 
were concerned that there was no specific place to seck redress at The University for com-
plaints of racial harassment. 
Id. at 2; MASSACHUSETIS COMMISSION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION, REPORT OF UNIVERSITY OF 
MASSACHUSETIS INVESTIGATION 2 (1986) (investigation of 1986 racial incident on campus cited 
need to "review ••. the context of recent UMASS [racial] history," to better understand the factors 
that led to what most witnessing the incident characterized as a "race riot"). 
Note that many of these incidents go unrecorded because universities have not taken a stand 
against racist speech, defining it as a reportable offense or provided meehanisms or forums for re-
porting these incidents and their effeet. A similar situation exists with regard to sexual harassment. 
See Sexual Harassment Survey, Student Affairs Research & Evaluation Office, University of Massa-
chusetts at Amherst (S89-C Feb. 1989). The University of Massachusetts study was designed to 
assess the feelings of students about sexual harassment and the mechanisms at the University to 
address their concerns. Although a majority of the students surveyed expressed first- or second-
hand experience with sexual harassment, 34.2% of the women were unaware that there was a uni-
versity policy prohibiting the harassment, and 60% were unaware of the university's specific griev-
ance procedure. See also Kent, The Silence of Survivors: Reporting Rape-Hazy Definition and 
Lack of Protocol Impede Reporting. Stanford Daily, Feb. 28, 1990, at i, col. 2 ("[M]any people 
decide not to report aequaintance rape, aqd those who work with the issue say a main reason is that 
the University has no formal protocol for reporting highly sensitive cases like rape."). 
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hostile) work environment127 and in federal and state regulations prohib-
iting sexual harassment on campuses as well as in the work place. 128 
All three of these very tangible, continuing, and often irreparable 
forms of injury-psychic, reputational, and the denial of equal educa-
tional opportunity-must be recognized, accounted for, and balanced 
against the claim that a regulation aimed at the prevention of these inju-
ries may lead to restrictions on important first amendment liberties. 
B. The Other Side of the Balance: Does the Suppression of Racial 
Epithets Weigh for or Against Speech? 
In striking a balance, we also must think about what we are weigh-
ing on the side of speech. Most blacks-unlike many white civillibertar-
ians-do not have faith in free speech as the most important vehicle for 
liberation. The first amendment coexisted with slavery, and we still are 
not sure it will protect us to the same extent that it protects whites. It 
often is argued that minorities have benefited greatly from first amend-
ment protection and therefore should guard it jealously. We are aware 
that the struggle for racial equality has relied heavily on the persuasion 
of peaceful protest protected by the first amendment, but experience also 
teaches us that our petitions often go unanswered until they disrupt busi-
ness as usual and require the self-interested attention of those persons in 
power. 129 
127. For example, in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), the Supreme Court 
held that sexual harassment that creates a hostile or abusive work environment constitutes a viola· 
tion of Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination in employment. The Court referred to an 
EEOC guideline that defined sexual harassment as "[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sex· 
ual favors and other verbal and physical conduct of a sexual nature." ld. at 65. The Court also 
made clear that racial harassment would violate Titlc VII. Although thc Court has noted that "mere 
utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an employee" is not by 
itself actionable conduct under the statute, this is not because the racial epithet is protected by the 
first amendment, but because the legislature has not detcrmined that, standing in isolation, it is an 
act of employment discrimination. ld. at 67 (citing Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), 
cerro denied. 406 U.S. 957 (1972». 
128. See Alexander V. Yale University, 631 F.2d 178, 184 (1980) ("In a Title IX suit, it is the 
deprivation of 'educational' benefits which, once proven, allows the court to afford relief. The stat· 
ute recognizes that loss of edueational benefits is a significant injury, redressable by law." However, 
the court ruled that the damages were too speculative to receive judicial remedy.). 
129. Professor Derrick Bell has argued that the civil rights demonstrations of the 1960s were 
effective to the extent that they were successful in fomenting "creative disorder." He notes that these 
protests were all disruptive in one way or another in that they disturbed the peace and tranquility of 
the status quo, posed a threat of civil disorder, and challenged closely.held beliefs. Often, as with the 
sit·ins and boycotts, they threatened economic loss and political problems. Indeed, most of these 
protests resulted in violence, although the violence was most often perpetrated against the protestors. 
See D. BELL, supra note 50, at 283·87, 287·330. 
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Paradoxically, the disruption that renders this speech effective usu-
ally causes it to be considered undeserving of first amendment protec-
tion. 130 Note the cruel irony in the news story appearing in the 
"Newsreel" at the beginning of this Article that describes Stanford Presi-
dent Kennedy's justification for prosecuting students engaged in a peace-
ful sit-in for violation of the University's Fundamental Standard. While 
protesting students were punished, the racist behavior the students were 
protesting went unpunished. This lack of symmetry was justified on the 
grounds that punishment might violate the bigots' first amendment 
rights. 131 Once faith in this symmetry is shaken, the absolutist position 
loses credence. It is difficult for us to believe that we should fight to 
protect speech rights for racists because that will ensure our own speech 
rights. Our experience is that the American system of justice has never 
been symmetrical where race is concerned. No wonder we see equality as 
a precondition to free speech, and we place more weight on that side of 
the balance aimed at the removal of the badges and incidents of slavery 
that'continue to flourish in our culture. 
Blacks and other people of color are equally skeptical about the ab-
solutist argument that even the most injurious speech must remain un-
regulated because in an unregulated marketplace of ideas the best ideas 
will rise to the top and gain acceptance. 132 Our experience tells us the 
130. In examining the first amendment cases coming out of the civil rights protests of the 1960s 
one observes that although the Court went to some length to reverse convictions in peaceful protests 
designed to achieve conformity with Brown. they generally denied review to those cases in which 
there was evidence of disruption or violence-particularly in those cases where the disruption 
seemed to emanate from the protestors. Compare Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 151 (1966) 
(Black, J., dissenting) (reversing the disorderly conduct conviction of blacks who participated in a 
non-violent and ostensibly quiet sit-in at a public library that barred blacks) with Walker v. City of 
Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967) (upholding contempt convictions for violating an injunction 
against the Good Friday and Easter Sunday Birmingham marches. noting the critical importance of 
law and order) and Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 617 (1968) (ruling that picketers at voting 
registration facilities could be arrested for violating Mississippi law that prohibits conduct which 
"unreasonably interferes with ingress or egress to or from a courthouse"). See also D. BELL, supra 
note 50, at 296-300 (noting that as the "non-violent, prayer-oriented Southeru protests of the early 
1960s" grew in militancy, the Court continued its earlier practice of ruling against the protesters 
when the protest was accompanied by violence). 
131. Derrick Bell notes an additional irony in observing that it was black students' civil rights 
protests that established the precedents upon which white students relied to establish their first 
amendment rights in school and university settings. See Tinker v. Des Moines 1ndep. Community 
School Dist., 39 U.S. 503 (1969) (relying upon Dixon v. Alabama Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d ISO (5th 
Cir. 1961». Bell asserts that when "policy changes are effected, whites usually will prove the pri-
mary beneficiaries, and blacks will have paid the major cost." D. BELL, supra note 50, at 457. 
132. The "marketplace of ideas" model sees speech as instrumental to democratic self govern-
ment. It argUes that truth (or the best perspectives or solutions) can be discovered through robust 
debate, frec from government interference. In this model, the value of free speech lies not in the 
liberty interests of individual speakers, but in the societal benefits derived from unimpeded discus-
sion. This theory has its origins in JOHN STUART MILL'S, ON LIBERTY ch. 2 (1859) (S. Collini ed. 
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opposite. We have seen too many demagogues elected by appealing to 
America's racism. We have seen too many good, liberal politicians shy 
away from the issues that might brand them as too closely allied with us. 
The American marketplace of ideas was founded with the idea of the 
racial inferiority of non-whites as one of its chief commodities, and ever 
since the market opened, racism has remained its most active item in 
trade. 133 
But it is not just the prevalence and strength of the idea of racism 
that makes the unregulated marketplace of ideas an untenable paradigm 
for those individuals who seek full and equal personhood for all. The 
real problem is that the idea of the racial inferiority of non-whites infects, 
skews, and disables the operation of the market (like a computer virus, 
sick cattle, or diseased wheat). Racism is irrational and often uncon-
scious. 134 Our belief in the inferiority of non-whites trumps good ideas 
that contend with it in the market, often without our even knowing it. 13s 
In 'addition, racism makes the words and ideas of blacks and other de-
spised minorities less saleable, regardless of their intrinsic value, in the 
marketplace of ideas. 136 It also decreases the total amount of speech that 
enters the market by coercively silencing members of those groups who 
are its targets. 137 
Racism is an epidemic infecting the marketplace of ideas and ren-
dering it dysfunctional. Racism is ubiquitous. We are all racists.138 Ra-
cismis also irrational. Individuals do not embrace or reject racist beliefs 
1989). Justice Holmes established its place in first amendment jurisprudence in his dissent in 
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919): 
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to 
believe ... that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the 
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes can 
safely be carried out. 
Id. at 630. 
133. See Lawrence, supra note 20, at 330 ("[Racism] is a part of our common historical experi. 
ence and, therefore, a part of our culture .• " We attach significance to race even when wc are not 
aware that we are doing so . . . . Racism's universality renders it normal."). 
134. Id. at 339-44; see infra notes 139-40 and accompanying text. 
135. See Lawrence, supra note 20, at 341 n.l0l (relating the story of a Mexican·American law 
student who was complimented by a middle-aged white male interviewer: "You speak very good 
English." The student responded that her family has lived in Santa Barbara for four generations. 
The interviewer was unconscious of the racial stereotype underlying his intended compliment.). 
136. Catharine MacKinnon argues, similarly, that pornography causes women to be taken less 
seriously as they enter the public arena. MacKinnon, supra note 47, at 325.26, 335 (1984). See also 
Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589, 618·19 (analogizing the case 
for anti·pornography legislation to footnote four in United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 
144, 152 (1938), and rccognizing "maldistribution of private power"). 
137. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text. 
138. See Lawrence, supra note 20, where he describes America's racist heritage: 
Americans share a common historical and cultural heritage in which racism has played 
and still plays a dominant role. Because of this shared experience, we also inevitably share 
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as the result of reasoned deliberation. 139 For the most part, we do not 
recognize the myriad ways in which the racism pervading our history 
and culture influences our beliefs. In other words, most of our racism is 
unconscious. 140 
The disruptive and disabling effect on the market of an idea that is 
Ubiquitous and irrational, but seldom seen or acknowledged, should be 
apparent. If the community is considering competing ideas about pro-
viding food for children, shelter for the hom~less, or abortions for preg-
nant women, and the choices made among the proposed solutions are 
influenced by the idea that some children, families, or women are less 
deserving of our sympathy because they are not white, thep the market is 
not functioning as either John Stuart Mill or Oliver Wendell <Holmes en-
visioned it. In John Ely's terms there is a "process defect."141 
Professor Ely coined the term "process defect" in the context of de-
veloping a theory to identify instances in which legislative action should 
be subjected to heightened judicial scrutiny under the equal protection 
many ideas, attitudes, and beliefs that attach significance to an individual's race and induce 
negative feelings and opinions about non-whites. To ~he extent that this cultural belief 
system has infiuenced all of us, we are all racists. 
Id. at 322. 
139. For a more detailed discussion of the irrationality of racism, see Lawrence, supra note 20, at 
331-36 (discussing the persistence of racist thinking despite personal experience that contradicts the 
racist belief; racist beliefs based on instinctive and unexplained distaste for members of the target 
group). Marie Jahoda notes that "racial prejUdice, in its narrowest sense, is an attitude towards out-
groups which refrains from reality-testing not just because the mental effort is too much but because 
the attitude itself fulfills a specific irrational function for its bearer." M. JAHODA, RACE RELATIONS 
AND MENTAL HEALTH 11 (1960) (UNESCO publication). See a/so G. ALLPORT, supra note 116, at 
85-87, 317-19. 
140. I have explored the phenomena of unconscious racism and its relationship to the jurispru-
dence of equal protection at some length elsewhere. See Lawrence, supra note 20. In that article I 
noted two explanations for the predominance of unconscious racist beliefs and ideas: 
First, Freudian theory states that the human mind defends itself against the discomfort of 
gUilt by denying or refusing to recognize those ideas, wishes, and beliefs that conflict with 
what the individual has learned is good or right. While our historical experience has made 
racism an integral part of our culture, our society has more recently embraced an ideal that 
rejects racism as immoral. When an individual experiences conflict between racist ideas 
and the societal ethic that condemns those ideas, the mind excludes his racism from 
consciousness. 
Second, the theory of cognitive psychology states that the culture-including, for ex-
ample, the media and an individual's parents, peers, and authority figures-transmits cer-
tain beliefs and preferences. Because these beliefs are so much a part of the CUlture, they 
are not experienced as explicit lessons. Instead, they seem part of the individual's rational 
ordering of her perceptions of the world. The individual is unawarei for example, that the 
ubiquitous presence of a cultural stereotype has influenced her perception that blacks are 
lazy or unintelligent. Because racism is so decply ingrained in our culture, it is likely to be 
transmitted by tacit understandings: Even if a child is not told that blacks are inferior, he 
learns that lesson by observing the behavior of others. These tacit understandings,because 
they have never been articulated, are less likely to be experienced at a conscious level. 
Id. at 322-23 (footnotes omitted). 
141. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 103-04, 135-
79 (1980). 
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clause. Ely argues that the courts should interfere with the normal 
majoritarian political process when the defect of prejudice bars groups 
subject to widespread vilification from participation in the political pro-
cess and causes governmental decisionmakers to misapprehend the costs 
and benefits of their actions.142 This same process defect that excludes 
vilified groups and misdirects the government operates in the market-
place of ideas. Mill's vision of truth emerging through competition in the 
marketplace of ideas relies on the ability of members of the body politic 
to recognize "truth" as serving their interest and to act on that recogni-
tion.l43 As such, this vision depends upon the same process that James 
Madison referred to when he described his vision of a democracy in 
which the numerous minorities within our society would form coalitions 
to create majorities with overlapping interests through pluralist wheeling 
and dealing. l44 Just as the defect of prejudice blinds the white voter to 
interests that overlap with those of vilified minorities, it also blinds him 
to the "truth" of an idea or the efficacy of solutions associated with that 
vilified groUp.14S And just as prejudice causes the governmental deci-
sionmakers to misapprehend the costs and benefits of their actions, it also 
causes all of us to misapprehend the value of ideas in the market. 
Prejudice that is unconscious or unacknowledged causes even more 
distortions in the market. When racism operates at a conscious level, 
opposing ideas may prevail in open competition for the rational or moral 
sensibilities of the market participant. But when an individual is una-
ware of his prejudice, neither reason nor moral persuasion will likely 
succeed. 146 
Racist speech also distorts the marketplace of ideas by muting or 
devaluing the speech of blacks and other non-whites. An idea that would 
be embraced by large numbers of individuals if it were offered by a white 
individual will be rejected or given less credence because its author be-
longs to a group demeaned and stigmatized by racist beliefs. 
142. Id. at 152-58. 
143. J.S. MILL, supra note 132, at ch. 2. 
144. THE FEDERAUSf No. 51, at 323-24 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). 
145. J. ELY, supra note 141, at 153. 
146. See Lawrence, supra note 20, at 347-49 (arguing that Ely's process defect theory is incom-
plete to the extent that it does not take into account the process distortions caused by unconscious 
racism). 
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An obvious example of this type of devaluation would be the black 
political candidate whose ideas go unheard or are rejected by white vot-
ers, although voters would embrace the same ideas if they were champi-
oned by a white candidate.147 Racial minorities have the same 
experiences on a daily basis when they endure the microaggression of 
having their words doubted, or misinterpreted, or assumed to be without 
evidentiary support,148 or when their insights are ignored and then ap-
propriated by whites who are assumed to have been the original 
authority. 149 
Finally, racist speech decreases the total amount of speech that 
reaches the market. I noted earlier in this Article the ways in which 
racist speech is inextricably linked with racist conduct. The primary 
purpose and effect of the speech/conduct that constitutes white 
supremacy is the exclusion of non-whites from full participation in the 
body politic. Sometimes the speech/conduct of racism is direct and obvi-
ous. When the Klan bums a cross on the lawn of a black person who 
joined the NAACP or exercised his right to move to a formerly all-white 
147. Exit polls taken during the recent mayoral election in New York City and the gubernatorial 
election in Virginia overstated the support among white voters for the black candidates. The dis-
crepancy has been attnouted to a reluctance among white voters to admit, even anonymously, to not 
voting for a black candidate. Rosenthal, Broad Disparities in Votes and Polls Raising Questions. 
N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1989, at AI, col. 2. 
Once again, the experience of one of my gay students provides the paradigmatic example of how 
ideas are less acceptable when their authors are members of a group that has been victimized by 
hatred and villification. Bob had not "come out" when he first came to law school. During his first 
year, when issues relating to heterosexism came up in class or in discussions with other students, he 
spoke to these issues as a sympathetic "straight" white male student. His arguments were listened to 
and taken seriously. In his second year, when he had "come out" and his classmates knew that he 
was gay, he found that he was not nearly as persuasive an advocate for his position as when he was 
identified as "straight." He was the same person saying the same things, but his identity gave him 
less authority. 
148. See Davis, Law as Microaggression, 98 YALE L.J. 1559, 1568 (1989) (describing a court-
house scene in which a white city attorney seizes upon the most pejorative interpretation of a black 
woman's question: "The inferiority of the black is more than an implicit assertion; it is a back-
ground assumption that supports the seizure of a prerogative."). 
149. See G. Lopez, The Well-Defined Academic Identity (Jan. 7, 1990) (unpUblished manu-
script) (available from author) (AALS Law and Humanities panel speech on white revisionism of 
scholars of color); Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review o/Civil Rights Literature, 
132 U. PA. L. REV. 561, 564-65 (1984); Weiss & Melling, The Legal Education o/Twenty Women, 
40 STAN. L. REv. 1299, 1336 (1988) ("There were times when women made points, and they were 
ignored or trivialized. Five minutes later, a man would make the same point ... and it was dis-
cussed."); Fox, Women and Higher Education: Sex Differentials in the Status 0/ Students and Schol-
ars, in WOMEN: A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE 238,244-46 (J. Frecman 3d ed. 1989) (a "subtle and 
silent language differentiates males and females"; faculty encourages males while "reinforce[ing] the 
invisibility of female students"); G. STEINEM, Men and Women Talking, in OUTRAGEOUS Acrs 
AND EVERYDAY REBELLIONS 176 (1983) (gender differences in communication often due to sexism, 
not biology-to transform "politics of talking" requires a feminist ~ult). 
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neighborhood, the effect of this speech does not result from the persua-
sive power of an idea operating freely in the market. It is a threat, a 
threat made in the context of a history of lynchings, beatings, and eco-
nomic reprisals that made good on earlier threats, a threat that silences a 
potential speaker. ISO The black student who is subjected to racial epi-
thets is likewise threatened and silenced. Certainly she, like the victim of 
a cross-burning, may be uncommonly brave or foolhardy and ignore the 
system of violence in which this abusive speech is only a bit player. But 
it is more likely that we, as a community, will be denied the benefit of 
many of her thoughts and ideas. lSI 
Again MacKinnon's analysis of how first amendment law miscon-
strues pornography is instructive. She notes that in concerning them-
selves only with government censorship, first amendment absolutists fail 
to recognize that whole segments of the population are systematically 
silenced by powerful private actors. "As a result, [they] cannot grasp 
that the speech of some silences the speech of others in a way that is not 
simply a matter of competition for airtime."lS2 
C. Asking Victim Groups to Pay the Price 
Whenever we decide that racist hate speech must be tolerated be-
cause of the importance of tolerating unpopular speech we ask blacks 
and other subordinated groups to bear a burden for the good of society-
to pay the price for the societal benefit of creating more room for speech. 
And we assign this burden to them without seeking their advice, or con-
sent. This amounts to white domination, pure and simple. ls3 It is taxa-
tion without representation. We must be careful that the ease with which 
we strike the balance against the regnlation of racist speech is in no way 
influenced by the fact the cost will be borue by others. lS4 We must be 
150. When speech directly threatens violence, as in the phrase "your money or your life" or in 
the phone call that takes responsibility for the terrorist bomb attack and threatens another, we recog-
nize its inextricability from the accompanying conduct. It is more difficult to recognize the threat 
when the violence is systemic and need not be directly referenced in the speech, but the threat is just 
as effective, arguably even more so. 
151. Catharine MacKinnon has noted that it is difficult to demonstrate empirically that pornog-
raphy chills women's speech because "silence is not eloquent." C. MACKINNON, supra note 53, at 
206. 
152. Id. 
153. See R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 286-92 (1986) (increasing the social wealth of the com-
munity along purely utilitarian lines may undercut critical moral convictions). 
154. Mari Matsuda has explored the ways that racist speech destroys normal relations and nor-
mal social interaction between groups. Among these is the way in which whites eannot help but feel 
a moment of relief that they are not the target, even as they reject the message of hate-speech. 
I know, for instance, that when I get anti-Semitic literature, two things go on: one, anger, 
and two, a moment when 1 think, it's not me, thank God. Then I have to reject that and 
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certain that the individuals who pay the price are fairly represented in 
our deliberation, and that they are heard. 
Even as our discussions concerning the efficacy of regulating racist 
speech on campuses continue, they evidence our lack of attention to the 
costs of constitutional injury borne by the victims. I have had scores of 
conversations about this topic over the past several months with stu-
dents, colleagues, university administrators, ACLU board members, re-
porters, friends, relatives, and strangers. By now there is an experience 
of deja vu each time I am asked to explain how a good civil libertarian 
like myself-a veteran of 1960s sit-ins and demonstrations, a liberal con-
stitutional law professor, and a person who has made antiestablishment 
speech his vocation--could advocate censorship. I try to be patient, ar-
ticulate, and good-natured as I set forth the concerns and arguments ex-
plored in this Article. I try to listen carefully, to remain open to others' 
experiences and to my own strong instincts against governmental incur-
sion on individual liberty. 
Often when I am at my best, even the most steadfast defenders of 
the first amendment faith will concede that these are persuasive argu-
ments. They say they agree with much of what I have said, they recog-
nize I am proposing narrowly framed restrictions on only the most 
abusive, least substantive forms of racist speech, and they understand the 
importance of hearing the victims' stories. Then they say, "But I'm 
afraid I still come out differently from you in the end. I still don't see 
how we can allow even this limited regulation of racist speech without 
running some risk of endangering our first amendment liberties." 
One of these encounters occurred at a recent dinner with colleagues 
in New York. My good friend and former colleague john powell-john 
is National Legal Director of the ACLU and he is black-was in attend-
ance. He told the following story: 
My family was having Thanksgiving dinner at the home of friends . 
. We are vegetarians and my two kids were trying to figure out which of 
the two dressings on the table was the vegetarian dressing and which 
was the meat dressing. One of our hosts pointed to one of the dress-
ings and said, "This is the regular dressing and the other is the vegeta-
rian dressing." I corrected him saying, "There is no such thing as 
'regular' dressing. There is meat dressing and there is vegetarian dress-
ing, but neither one of them is regular dressing." 
say no. An attack on any people ... is an attack on me. But there is that secret guilty 
moment of gratitude that one is not the victim. 
Language as Violence v. Freedom of Expression: Canadian and American Perspectives on Group Def-
amation, 37 BUFFALO L. REV. 337, 360-61 (1989) (comments of Marl Matsuda). 
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This incident reminded john of the discussions he has had with his 
colleagues on the subject of regulating racist speech. "Somehow," he 
said, 
I always come away from these discussions feeling that my white col-
leagues think about the first amendment the way my friend thought 
about "regular" [meat] dressing, as an amendment for regular people 
or all people, and that they think of the equal protection clause of the 
fourteenth amendment the way my friend thought about vegetarian 
dressing, as a special amendment for a minority of different people. 
Inevitably, in these conversations, those of us who are non-white 
bear the burden of justification, of justifying our concern for protection 
under our "special" amendment. It is not enough that we have demon-
strated tangible and continuing injury committed against the victims of 
racist speech. There can be no public remedy for our special fourteenth 
amendment injury until we have satisfied our interlocutors that there is 
no possible risk of encroachment on their first amendment-the "regu-
lar" amendment,lSS 
If one asks why we always begin by asking whether we can afford to 
fight racism rather than asking whether we can afford not to, or if one 
asks why my colleagues who oppose all regulation of racist speech do not 
feel that the burden is theirs (to justify a reading of the first amendment 
that requires sacrificing rights guaranteed under the equal protection 
clause), then one sees an example of how unconscious racism operates in 
the marketplace of ideas. 
Well-meaning individuals who are committed to equality without 
regard to race, and who have demonstrated that commitment in many 
arenas, do not recoguize where the burden of persuasion has been placed 
in this discussion. When they do, they do not understand why. Even as 
I experienced the frustration of always bearing the burden of persuasion, 
I did not see the source of my frustration or understand its significance 
until john told his story about the Thanksgiving dressing. Unfortunately, 
our unconscious racism causes us (even those of us who are the direct 
ISS. Professor Stressen's response to this article, see supra note *, is paradigmatic of this ap-
proach to the issue. Throughout she acknowledges the presence of tangible and continuing injuries 
to non-white students from incidents of verbal racial harassment on university campuses, but, having 
done so, she rejects even narrowly drafted university regulations aimed at protecting those students 
from injury on the grounds that these regulations may chill protected speech or lead down a slippery 
slope to broader regulations. See id. at 541. It should be noted that, despite Professor Strossen's 
observation that our positions are not that far apart, she has not yet found a regulation of racially 
harassing speech that she will endorse nor has she drafted one hcrself. The burden, therefore, re-
mains with those whose rights to equal access are daily compromised to find a way to protect them-
selves without compromising the first amendment. 
Vol. 1990:431] REGULATING RACIST SPEECH 475 
victims of racism), to view the first amendment as the "regular" amend-
ment-an amendment that works for all people-and the equal protec-
tion clause and racial equality as a special-interest amendment important 
to groups that are less valued. IS6 . 
Derrick Bell has noted that often in our constitutional history the 
rights of blacks have been sacrificed because sacrifice. was believed neces-
sary to preserve the greater interests of the whole. Is7 It is not just the 
actual sacrifice that is racist but also the way the "whole with the greater 
interests" gets defined. Today in a' world committed to the ideal of 
equality, we rarely notice the sacrifice or how we have avoided noticing 
the sacrifice by defining the interests of whites as the whole, "the regu-
lar." When we think this way, when we see the potential danger of in-
cursions on the first amendment but do not see existing incursions on the 
fourteenth amendment, our perceptions have been influenced by an en-
tire belief system that makes us less sensitive to the injury experienced 
by non-whites. Unaware, wc have adopted a world view that takes for 
granted black sacrifice. 
Professor Richard Delgado has suggested there is another way in 
which those of us who abhor racist speech but insist that it cannot be 
regulated may be, perhaps unwittingly, benefiting from the presence of "a 
certain amount of low grade racism" in the environment: 
I believe that racist speech benefits powerful white-domjnated institu-
tions. The highly educated, refined persons who operate the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin, other universities, major corporations, would never, 
ever themselves utter a racial slur. That is the last thing they would 
do. " 
Yet, they benefit, and on a subconscious level they know they ben-
efit, from a certain amount of low-grade racism in the environment. If 
an occasional bigot or redneck calls one of us a nigger or spick one 
night late as we're on our way home from the library, that is all to the 
good. Please understand that I am not talking about the very heavy 
stuff-violence, beatings, bones in the nose. That brings out the TV 
cameras and the press and gives the university a black eye. I mean the 
daily, low-grade largely invisible stuff, the hassling, cruel remarks, and 
other things that would be covered by rules. This kind of behavior 
156. I am indebted to my friend and colleague john powell for this insight. 
157. See D. BELL, supra note 50, at 30 ("In the resolution of racial issues in America, black 
interests are often sacrificed so that identifiably different groups of whites may settle a dispute and 
establish or reestablish their relationship. "); D. BELL, The Real Status of Blacks Today: The Chroni-
cal of Constitutional Contradiction, in AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RA-
CIAL JUSTICE 26, 40 (1987) (Bell's primary protagonist, Geneva Crenshaw, addresses the delegates 
to the Constitutional Convention of 1787: "So ... you are saying that slavery for blacks not only 
provided wealth for rich whites but, paradoxically, led also to grcater freedom for poor whites," this 
freedom allowed poor whites to provide more support for the struggle against the British.). 
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keeps non-white people on edge, a little off balance. We get these oc-
casional reminders that we are different, and not really wanted. It pre-
vents us from digging in too strongly, starting to think we could really 
belong here. It makes us a little introspective, a little unsure of our-
selves; at the right low-grade level it prevents us from organizing on 
behalf of more important things. It assures that those of us of real 
spirit, real pride, just plain leave-all of which is quite a substantial 
benefit for the institution. ISS 
IV. "WHICH SIDE ARE (WE) ON?" 
However one comes out on the question of whether racist hate 
speech should be artificially distinguished from other fighting words and 
given first amendment protection, it is important to examine and take 
responsibility for the effects of how one participates in the debate. It is 
important to consider how our voice is heard. We must ask ourselves 
whether, in our well-placed passion for preserving our first amendment 
freedoms, we have been forceful enough in our personal condemnation of 
ideas we abhor, whether we have neglected our alliances with victims of 
the oppressive manifestations of the continuing dominance of these ideas 
within our communities and within ourselves. 
At the core of the argument that we should resist all government 
regulation of speech is the ideal that the best cure for bad speech is good 
speech, and ideas that affirm equality and the worth of all individuals 
ultimately will prevail over racism, sexism, homophobia, and anti-semi-
tism because they are better ideas. 1S9 This is an empty ideal-one that 
invites those injured or appalled by hate-speech to call for restrictions on 
speech-unless those of us who fight racism are vigilant and unequivocal 
in that fight. 
There is much about the way many civil libertarians have partici-
pated in the debate over the regulation of racist speech that causes the 
victims of that speech to wonder which side they are on. Those who 
158. Address by Richard Delgado, State Historical Society, Madison, Wisconsin (Apr. 24, 
1989). Professor Delgado draws an analogy to Susan Brownmiller's observation that rape is the 
crime of all men against all women. Men who would never commit rape and who abhor it nonethe-
less benefit from the climate of terror that the experience of rape helps create. 
The possibility of rape makes women defensive and scared. Some feel better at night if a man is 
at their shQulder. There also is an historical analogue in the black house servant who was protected 
from groups like the Klan as long as he haa the protection of the influential whites for whom he 
worked. The climate in which non-whites have reason to fear for their safety continues to this day. 
For example, black, latino, and Asian professors in university towns often go jogging carrying uni-
versity identification cards in case they are stopped by the local constabulary. 
159. Despite an optimism regarding the human capacity for good that can only be explained by 
faith, I am skeptical of ideals that provide the vehicle for oppressive ideology. I do not believe that 
truth will prevail in a rigged game or in a contest where the referees are on the payroll of the 
proponents of falsity. 
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raise their voices in protest against public sanctions of racist speech have 
not organized private protests against the voices of racism. It has been 
people of color, women, and gays who have held vigils at offending fra-
ternity houses, staged candlelight marches, counter-demonstrations and 
distributed flyers calling upon their classmates and colleagues to express 
their outrage at pervasive racism, sexism, and homophobia in their midst 
and to show their solidarity with its victims. 
Traditional civil libertarians have been conspicuous largely in their 
absence from these group expressions of condemnation. Their failure to 
participate in this marketplace response to speech with more speech is 
often justified, paradoxically, as concern for the principle of frec speech. 
When racial minorities or other victims of hate speech hold counter-dem-
onstrations or engage in picketing, leafletting, heckling, or booing of ra-
cist speakers, civil libertarians often accuse them of private censorship, 
of seeking to silence opposing points of view. 100 When both public and 
private responses to racist speech are rejected by first amendment abso-
lutists as contrary to the principle of free speech, it is no wonder that the 
victims of racism do not consider them allies. 
Blacks and other racial minorities also are made skeptical by the 
resistance encountered when we approach traditional civil liberties 
groups like the ACLU with suggestions that they merely reconsider the 
ways they engage in this complex debate concerning speech and equality. 
Traditional civil liberties lawyers typically have elected to stand by while 
universities have responded to the outbreak of hate speech by adopting 
regulations that often are drafted with considerable attention to appeas-
ing various, widely diverging political constituencies and only passing 
concern for either free speech or equality.161 Not surprisingly, these reg-
ulations are vague and overbroad. They provide easy prey for the white-
160. Increasingly, conservative white males have appropriated the rhetoric of "silencing" from 
the feminist and other outsider groups. See. e.g .• Williams, Organizations Meet on Law School Is-
sues, Stan. L.J., Oct. 1988, at I, col. 4 (deseribing a meeting with Stanford deans and student organi-
zation representatives on the problem of classroom silencing). In the spring of 1987 students of 
color, gay and lesbian st\ldents and women students organized a panel on silence in the classroom. 
Panel members deseribed the various ways in which their voices are not heard in traditional white 
male dominated law school classroom. Several conservative white males complained that they were 
not represented on the panel, arguing jhat they too were silenced by the dominant liberal culture 
among students and faculty. One student complained that one of his professors had referred to Chief 
Justice Rehnquist as Darth Vadar. (The alleged CUlprit was a white male professor.) One of the 
panel members, a lesbian, responded to the complaining student by saying, "If the Chief Justice of 
the Supreme Court were a radica1lesbian feminist, I wouldn't care what my Con Law professor 
called her." 
161. I believe that tliere is an element of unconscious collusion in the inability of universities, 
some with top notch legal staffs and fine law schools, to draft narrow, carefully crafted regulations. 
For example, it is difficult to believe that anyone at the University of Michigan Law School was 
consulted in drafting the regulation which was struck down at that university. See Doe v. University 
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hatted defenders of the first amendment faith who dutifully march into 
court to have them declared unconstitutional.162 
Minority delegates to the 1989 ACLU Biennial Convention pro-
posed a different approach. Their approach was to have the ACLU offer 
its expertise to schools and universities at the beginning of the legislative 
process, instead of waiting until the end to attack a predictably unaccept-
able regulation. 163 In the view of minority delegates, hearings should be 
held on university campuses where the incidence and nature of the in-
jury of racist speech could be carefully documented and responses that 
were least restrictive of protected speech could be recommended. Such 
an approach would serve two important purposes. It would give civil 
libertarians an opportunity to influence the process from the outset, en-
suring that the regulation reflected their constitutional concerns. It also 
would signal to racial minorities and other hate speech victims that the 
civil liberties community is aware of and concerned about issues of equal-
ity as well as free speech. But this approach to racist speech incidents 
was rejected at the national convention and has faced strong opposition 
when proposed to regional ACLU boards. l64 
There is also a propensity among some civil libertarians to minimal-
ize the injury to the victims of racist speech and distance themselves from 
it by characterizing individual acts of racial harassment as aberrations, as 
isolated incidents in a community that is otherwise free of racism. When 
of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (1989). It is almost as if the university purposefully wrote an unconstitu-
tional regulation so that they could say to the black students, "We tried to help you but the courts 
just won't let us do it." . 
162. It is not enough that some civil liberties lawyers have waited to attack poorly drafted and 
obviously overbroad regulations. Those lawyers have then pointed to these same regulations' inade-
quacies as evidence of the danger that efforts to regulate racist speech will inevitably lead to rules 
that will chill expression that should be protected. See, e.g., Strossen supra note -, at 526-30 (citing 
several problems with the University of Michigan's clearly overbroad statute in support of her argu-
ment that the recently adopted Stanford University proposed regulation also is unconstitutional and 
that even narrow anti-hate-speech rules may contain constitutional pitfalls"). 
163. For text of adopted resolution see Strossen, supra note -, at 484 n.t. Professor Strossen 
cites the ACLU's policy on sexual harassment in the workplace as evidence of that organization's 
non-absolutist view of protected speech. See Strossen, supra note -, at 498-99. In the course of 
ongoing discussions regarding its policies on racist speech, some members of the ACLU have sug-
gested that the organization adopt a policy concerning racist speech on campus that tracks its policy 
on sexual harassment in the workplace. Thus far, the suggestion has not found widespread support 
within the ranks of the organization. Initially, this suggestion did not find widespread support 
within the organization. Shortly after the Biennial Convention, the California chapters adopted a 
policy that closely followed the one suggested by minority delegates. Subsequently, a similar policy 
was adopted by the national organization. 
164. For a history of the heated debate around ACLU policy concerning racist speech within the 
boards of two California regions, see Blum & Lobaco, Fighting Words at the ACLU, CALIF. LAW., 
Feb. 1990, at 43. The National Legal Director of the ACLU, john powell, has begun to reopen this 
discussion within the ACLU at the national level. For Professor Strossen's comments on the 
ACLU's focus on this issue, see Strossen, supra note -, at 496-500. 
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those persons who argue against the regulation of racist speech speak of 
"silencing a few creeps" or argue that "the harm that censors allege will 
result unless speech is forbidden rarely occurs," they demonstrate an un-
willingness even to acknowledge the injury. Moreover, they disclaim any 
responsibility for its occurrence. 16S 
The recent outbreak. of racism on our campuses in its most obvious 
manifestations provides an opportunity to examine the presence of less 
overt forms of racism within our educational institutions. But the debate 
that has followed these incidents has focused on the first amendment 
freedoms of the perpetrators rather than the university community's re-
sponsibility for creating an environment where such acts occur. The re-
surgence of flagrant racist acts has not occurred in a vacuum. It is 
evidence of more widespread resistance to change by those holding posi-
tions of dominance and privilege in institutions, which until recently 
were exclusively white. Those who continue to be marginalized in these 
institutions-by their token inclusion on faculties and administrations, 
by the exclusion of their cultures from core curricula, and by commit-
ments to diversity and multi-culturalism that seem to require assimila-
tion more than any real change in the university-cannot help but see 
their colleagues' attention to free speech as an avoidance of these larger 
issues of equality.166 
165. A recent conversation with a colleague about an incident at Stanford exemplifies this phe-
nomenon. Two white freshmen had defaced a poster bearing the likeness of Beethoven. They had 
colored the drawing of Beethoven brown, given it wild curly hair, big lips and red eyes and posted it 
on the door of a black student's dorm room in Ujamaa, the black theme house. An investigation of 
the incident revealed that the two white students involved had been in an argument with the same 
black student the night before. They had contested the black student's assertion that Beethoven was 
of African descent. See Two Racial Incidents Strike Ujamaa House, Stanford Daily, Oct. 17, 1988, 
at I, col. 4. It appeared that the "Sambo"-like defacement of the portrait was the white students' 
final rebuttal to the black student's claim of familial relationship with the great composer-that this 
caricature was meant to ridicule the idea that such a genius could be black-could be "sambo." 
My colleague shared my outrage at these students' behavior but went on to say that he thought 
that I had misinterpreted the import of the incident in viewing it as a manifestation of more wide-
spread racism at Stanford. To the contrary, he was inclined to explain the students' behavior as that 
of two rather isolated, iguorant, misguided youth acting out against the dominant liberal culture. 
This hardly seemed an accurate description to me. The message conveyed by the defaced poster 
replicated, in a crude form, an argument that was being made by much of the Stanford faculty in the 
then current debate over Stanford's Western Civilization requirement. The thrust of much of the 
argument for maintaining a Eurocentric curriculum requirement that included no contributions of 
people of color was that there were no significant non-European contributions to be included. The 
students' defacement had added a graphic footnote to that argument. It seemed to me-contrary to 
my colleague's explanation of the students' behavior-that they were imitating their role models in 
the professoriate, not rebelling against them. 
166. Some civil libertarians have argued that regulating a limited eategory of racist fighting 
words will only make a marginal differencc in the atmosphere for blacks on eampus. They urge that 
the (arger problems of racist attitudes and institutional practices will remain and that our resources 
are better spent on combating those problems. See Strossen supra note *, at 555-6\. I am in full 
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When the ACLU enters the debate by challenging the University of 
Michigan's efforts to provide a safe harbor for its black, hispanic, and 
Asian students (a climate that a colleague of mine compared unfavorably 
with Mississippi in the 1960s), we should not be surprised that non-white 
students feel abandoned. When we respond to Stanford students' pleas 
for protection by accusing them of seeking to silence all who disagree 
with them, we paint the harassing bigot as a martyred defender of de-
mocracy. When we valorize bigotry we must assume some responsibility 
for the fact that bigots are encouraged by their newfound status as "de-
fenders of the faith." We must find ways to engage actively in speech 
and action that resists and counters the racist ideas the first amendment 
protects. If we fail in this duty, the victims of hate speech rightly assume 
we are aligued with their oppressors. 
We must also begin to think creatively as lawyers. We must embark 
upon the development of a first amendment jurisprudence that is 
grounded in the reality of our history and contemporary experiencel67 
agreement with the need to work aggressively to disestablish institutional practices that marginalize 
non-whites and other subordinated groups. but I believe that the practices that exclude minorities 
from university professorships and the attitudes that devalue their contributions to the culture are 
inseparable from an atmosphere that engenders virulent recist speech. The speech/acts that "race" 
us must all be fought simultaneously for they are mutually dependent parts of a whole. 
At Stanford. I have responded to some of my colleagues who have urged that we turn our 
attention from the relatively trivial concern of recist speech to more important concerns like affirma-
tive action by suggesting that we tie the two efforts together. Why not hold the university responsi-
ble for individual violations of a regulation against recial harassment. much as the employer is held 
responsible under Title VII for the harassing acts of its employees? Each time a violation of the 
regulation against recist speech occurs there would be a public intervention in the form of a hearing 
and a public announcement of the judicial body's findings of fact. But instead of the university 
punishing the individuals involved. an affirmative remedy or reparation would be made by the uni-
versity to the offended elass. The university might set aside a slot for a minority professor, or fund 
an additional full scholarship for a minority student, or cancel classes for a day and have a univer-
sity-wide teach-in on recism. Such a proposal would directly address the institution's responsibility 
for maintaining a: discrimination-free environment; it would have the symbolic value provided by a 
clear university position against certain forms of recist speech, and it would avoid first amendment 
problems by placing public sanctions on the institution rather than the individual speaker. Ifminor-
ity students knew that concrete institutional resourees were being spent to change the atmosphere of 
recism on campus they would be less concerned that individual racist speakers were escaping sanc-
tion. As things are, they hear the call for fighting racist attitudes and prectices rather than speech as 
'just a lot of cheap talk." 
167. Critical Race Theory seeks to develop a first amendment jurisprudence that reflects a per-
sonal understanding of the recist context. For examples of this scholarship, see D. BELL, AND WE 
ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUESf FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 157, at 224-33 (1987); 
Crenshaw. Race. Reform. and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Anti-discrimina-
tion J;.Qw. 101 HARV. L. REv. 1331 (1988); see also Delgado, supra note 28, at 133 (arguing that an 
independent tort action for recial insults is both permissible and necessary); Hall, The Constitution 
and Race: A Critical Perspictive. 5 N.Y.L. SeH. J. HUM. RTS. 229 (1988) (providing a general 
overview of the dynamics of racism in the origin and development of constitutional law and attempt-
ing to refocus attention of constitutional celebrants to the "Black Freedom Struggle"); Matsuda, 
Affirmative Action and Legal Knowledge: Planting Seeds in Plowed-Up Ground. II HARV. WOMEN'S 
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(particularly the experiences of the victims of oppression). 168 We must 
eschew abstractions of first amendment theory that proceed without at-
tention to the dysfunction in the marketplace of ideas created by the ra-
cism and unequal access to that market. We must think hard about how 
best to launch legal attacks against the most indefensible forms of hate 
speech. Good lawyers can create exceptions and narrow interpretations 
limiting the harm of hate speech without opening the floodgates of cen-
sorship. We must weigh carefully and critically the competing constitu-
tional values expressed in the first and fourteenth amendments. 
A concrete step in this direction is the abandonment of overstated 
rhetorical and legal attacks on individuals who conscientiously seek to 
frame a public response to racism while preserving our first amendment 
liberties. I have ventured a second step in this Article by suggesting that 
the regulation of certain face-to-face racial vilification may be justified 
under current first amendment doctrine as an analogy to the protection 
of certain classes of captive audiences on university campuses. 169 Most 
importantly, we must continue this discussion. It must be a discussion in 
which the victims of racist speech are heard. We must be as attentive to 
the achievement of the constitutional ideal of equality as we are to the 
ideal of untrammeled expression. There can be no true free speech where 
there are still masters and slaves. 
L.J. 12 (1988) (affinnative action should apply to the exploration of human knowledge-"we should 
bend our shared legal knowledge to accommodate new visions"); Matsuda, supra note 25; Minority 
Critiques of the Critical Legal Studies Movement. 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 297 (1987) (collec-
tion of articles discussing the promise and the frustration that critical legal studies holds for minority 
scholarship and politics); Scales-Trent, Black Women and the Constitution: Finding Our Place. As-
serting Our Rights, 24 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 9 (1989) ("By creating two scparate categories for 
[society'S] major social problems-'the race problem' and 'the women's issue'-society has ignored 
the group that stands at the interstices of these two groups, black women in Ameriea. "); Williams, 
Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights. 22 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 
401,404-05 (1987) (detailing discomfort with that part of Critical Legal Studies which rejects rights-
based theory; asserting that CLS has ignored the degree to which rights-based theories have helped 
blacks, other minorities, and the poor). 
168. See Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations. 22 HARV. 
C.R-C.L. L. REV. 323, 324-25 (1987) (suggesting that legal scholars adopt as law's "nonnative 
source" the perspective of those who have expericnced discrimination-a new epistemology based on 
"the actual experience, history, culture, and intellectual tradition of people of color in America"). 
169. See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text. Mari Matsuda has made a more radical 
venture, which I believe may well in the long run prove more satisfactory. She calls for a doctrinal 
change that would involve an explicit content-based rejection of narrowly defined category of racist 
speech, and she argnes that such an approach would be more protective of civil liberties than those 
which involve the balancing of competing interests or the likelihood of incitement to violence, ap-
proaches that can spill over to censor fonns of political speech. See Matsuda, supra note 25, at 2356-
61. 
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EPILOGUE 
"Enie, menie, minie, mo." 
It is recess time at the South Main Street School. It is 1952, and I 
am nine. Eddie Becker, Muck Makowski, John Thomas, Terry Flynn, 
Howie Martin, and I are standing in a circle. Right feet thrust forward, 
the toes of our black, high-top Keds sneakers touching, forming a tight 
hub of white rubber at the center, our skinny blue-jeaned legs extend like 
spokes from the hub. Heads bowed, we are intently watching Muck, 
who is hunkered down on one knee so that he can touch our toes as he 
calls out the rhyme. We are enthralled and entranced by the drama of 
this boyhood ritual, this customary pre-game incantation. It is no less 
important than the game itself. 
But my mind is not on the ritual. I have lost track of the count that 
will determine whose foot must be removed from the hub, who will no 
longer have a chance to be a captain in this game. I hardly feel Muck's 
index finger as it presses through the rubber to my toes. My mind is on 
the rhyme. I am the only black boy in this circle of towheaded 
prepubescent males. Time stands still for me. My palms are sweaty and 
I feel a prickly heat at the back of my neck. I know that Muck will not 
say the word. 
"Catch a tiger by the toe." 
The heads stay down. No one looks at me. But I know that none of 
them is picturing the capture of a large striped animal. They are think-
ing of me, imagining my toe beneath the white rubber of my Keds 
sneaker-my toe attached to a large, dark, thick lipped, burr-headed 
American fantasy/nightmare. 
"If he hollers let him go." 
Tigers don't holler. I wish I could right now. 
My parents have told me to ignore this word that is ringing unut-
tered in my ears. "You must not allow those who speak it to make you 
feel small or ugly," they say. They are proud, Mississippi-bred black 
professionals and long-time political activists. Oft-wounded veterans of 
the war against the racist speech/conduct of Jim Crow and his many 
relations, they have, on countless occasions, answered the bad speech! 
conduct of racism with the good speech/conduct of their lives-repre-
senting the race, being smarter, cleaner and more morally upright than 
white folk to prove that black folk are equal, are fully human-refuting 
the lies of the cultural myth that is American racism. "You must know 
that it is their smallness, their ugliness of which this word speaks," they 
say. 
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I am struggling to heed their words, to follow their example, but I 
feel powerless before this word and its minions. In a moment's time it 
has made me an other. In an instant it has rebuilt the wall between my 
friends' humanity and my own, the wall that I have so painstakingly 
disassembled. 
I was good at games, not just a good athlete, but a strategist, a 
leader. I knew how to make my teammates feel good about themselves 
so that they played better. It just came naturally to me. I could choose 
up a team and make them feel like family. When other folks felt good, I 
felt good too. Being good at games was the main tool I used to knock 
down the wall I'd found when I came to this white school in this white 
town. I looked forward to recess because that was when I could do the 
most damage to the wall. But now this rhyme, this word, had undone all 
my labors. 
"Ene menie minie mo" 
I have no memory of who got to be captain or what game we played. 
I just wished Muck had used "one potato, two potato .... " We always 
used that at home. 
